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Is Somebody Crying "Wolf"?: An
Assessment of Whether Antitrust
Impedes Export Trade
John Will Ongman*
The impact of the United States antitrust laws on American exports has
in recent years become a controversial issue, especially in view of the increas-
ing U.S, trade deficit. In this article, Mr. Ongman employs economic analy-
sis to determine the desirability of a protectionistic Sherman Act. He
concludes that such apolicy, resulting in foreign retaliation and spillover into
the domestic market, would be unwise.
Although the economic world is interdependent, national chauvin-
ism in international trade still abounds. World leaders solemnly pledge
to defuse protectionist pressures in trade.I Prestigious private confer-
ences are convened to minimize the effects of parochial views.2 Never-
* Presently associated with Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illinois; member, Illinois Bar; J.D.,
1976, Northwestern University. The author would like to acknowledge and thank Professor
James A. Rahl, Northwestern University School of Law, for his thoughtful criticisms of the earlier
drafts of this article.
I At the Rambouillet Economic Summit, concluded Nov. 17, 1975, the leaders of the United
States, France, West Germany, Japan, Britain, and Italy "vowled] to avoid protectionism and to
accelerate multinational trade negotiations." Ryan, Goal of 6 Industrial Nations.- A void Protection-
ism, Inflation, J. COM., Nov. 18, 1975, at 1, col. 6. See Text of Statement After 6 Nation Economic
Parley, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1975, at 14, col. 1.
Finn Olav Gundelach, a member of the Commission of the European Economic Community,
has made a more detailed description of this commitment:
Nevertheless, in this matter there is an important-indeed, a crucial-distinction to be
made between protectionist pressures and protectionist measures. So far both in the commu-
nity and in the United States those responsible for deciding policy have on the whole been
able to avoid the adoption of protectionist measures. But we are all facing great and mount-
ing pressures. Our task is to ensure that these pressures are not translated into concrete meas-
ures of protection. In this common task we are all responsible-both the Community and its
member states, and the United States itself.
The moral we must surely draw from the present situation is that in a period of excep-
tional economic difficulty governments everywhere must be especially active not only in re-
sisting protectionist pressures but also in explaining to their citizens exactly why the
protectionist soft option must be resisted.
Address by Finn Olav Gundelach, Member of the Commission of the European Community, 62d
Nat'l Foreign Trade Convention, New York, N.Y. (Nov. 17, 1975).
2 The 62d National Foreign Trade Convention meeting in N.Y., Nov. 17-18, 1975, recognized
evidence of budding protectionism. In a general policy communiqud, it was noted that:
International cooperation and coordination of policy responses by the major nations are
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theless, in times of economic slump, countries look homeward. Indeed,
the Trade Act of 1974, while ostensibly a move to establish the free
trade principle in U.S. foreign policy, has been viewed by some as a
"veneer of free trade platitudes over a hard core of home market pro-
tectionism."'3
Accompanying this protectionist mood is the view that American
export traders "must take advantage of every legitimate technique to
win export orders in third markets" just as their European and Japa-
nese competitors do.4 This position is bolstered by a current trend in
the United States towards trader nation status. 5 This trend exists de-
spite America's vast domestic market. Consequently,.export expansion
programs are being given renewed attention. 6 These programs seek to
reduce the barriers to American export trade.
One of the factors most often claimed to be a barrier to American
export trade has been the extraterritorial application of American anti-
trust law. 7 Commentators have given continuing attention to the areas
urgently required to meet the pressures both of economic recession and continuing inflation
in world markets, and to deal with continuing balance of payments strains resulting from the
sharp escalation of oil prices. Such coordination of effort is essential to avert the danger of a
"beggar-thy-neighbor" spiral of protectionism which would only result in economic retro-
gression for all nations. The Council calls for continued action through the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in securing agreement for avoidance of unilateral restrictive trade measures as a means
of coping with balance of payments deficits. It calls for the sustained effort which will be
required in the GATT negotiations, and in other forums, to overcome the difficulties and
conflicts which can impair the prospects for achieving significant liberalization of world trade
and updating of trading rules to fit modem economic reality.
Policy Declaration of the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc. at 29-30 (Nov., 1975). Crittenden,
Warning Sounded on Protectionism, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1975, at 49, col. 8.
3 Address by Will E. Leonard, Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission, 62d Na-
tional Foreign Trade Convention, New York, N.Y. (Nov. 17, 1975). See generally Dale, How the
New Trade Law May Backfire, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1975, § 3, at 2, col. 1.
4 Address by Reginald H. Jones, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, General Electric
Company, 62d National Foreign Trade Convention, New York, N.Y. (Nov. 17, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Jones Speech].
5 If one considers foreign investment as an exported "product" and income generated on this
investment as the sale "price", total United States exports of goods and services amounted to $140
billion in 1974 or about 10% of GNP. In 1971, the corresponding figures were $66 billion and 6%
of GNP. Nearly 13% of total manufacturing output was exported in 1974. During 1971-74, ex-
ports grew at a rate 2.5 times the rate of growth of the GNP. Jones Speech, supra note 4.
6 See generally Mullen, Export Promotion. Legal and Structural Limitations on a Broad
United States Commitment, 7 LAW & PoY'y INT'L Bus. 57 (1975).
7 In the past 15 years a number of congressional hearings have developed a rich collection of
materials in the international antitrust field. The various hearings repeatedly used in this article
are: InternationalAspects ofAntitrust Laws Be/ore the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comnm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1973-74) [hereinafter cited as 1974
International Antitrust Hearings]; Export Expansion Legislation Be/ore the Subcomm. on Foreign
Commerce and Tourism ofthe Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pts. I & 2 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 InternationalAntitrust Hearings!; Hearings on S. 2754, Export Expansion
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where businessmen repeatedly object that American efforts are ham-
strung by the broad scope of American antitrust enforcement: export
trade,8 foreign licensing,9 consortia and joint ventures in manufactur-
ing abroad, 10 overseas acquisitions, 1 and East-West trade. 12
This article will not analyze the application of the antitrust laws to
the full range of foreign commercial activity engaged in by American
business.' 3 Rather, attention will be focused upon a single important
issue: whether extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws
does indeed impede American export trade in goods and services.
The issue of whether U.S. export trade is impeded by American
Act of 1971 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings];
International Aspects of Antitrust: Hearings on S. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as
1967 International Antitrust HearingsJ; International Aspects of Antitrust: Hearings on S. Res. 191
Before the Subcomtm on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt . 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 InternationalAntitrust Hearngs],'Foreign Trade and
the Antitrust Laws: Hearings on S. Res. 262 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 Inter-
national Antitrust Hearings.
Antitrust has received much attention. However, as a trade barrier it may be much less im-
portant than other non-tariff trade barriers. 1973 InternationalAntitrust Hearings at 297. For a
good overview of the complexity of international trade which shows that antitrust may be a rela-
tively minor factor in the overall assessment of international trade, see SUBCOMM. ON INT'L
TRADE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 2D SEss. EXECUTIVE BRANCH GATT
STUDIES, (Comm. Print 1974), and SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 2D Sass., SUMMARY
AND ANALYSIS OF H. R. 10710, THE TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973 (Comm. Print 1974).
8 See, e.g., Chapman, Exports andAntitrust: Must Competition Stop at the Water's Edge?, 6
VAND. J. TRANS. L. 399 (1973).
9 See, eg., Davidow, Antitrust and International Patent Licensing, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 530
(1974); Van Cise, Our Antitrust Laws and International Licensing, in PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1974 (1974).
10 See, e.g., Donovan, Joint Ventures, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 563 (1974); Holley, United States
Antitrust Laws as They Affect Investments Abroad, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS
AND SOLtTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1974 (1974).
11 See, ag., W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 330-53 (2d ed.
1973).
12 For an introduction to the problem of East-West trade and its antitrust aspects, see 1974
InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 110-45 (testimony of Samuel Pisar). The Com-
merce Department has sponsored discussions and studies in the area of East-West trade. J. Miller
& P. Marer, Issues of Antitrust in East-West Industrial Cooperation (August 19, 1975) (discussion
paper prepared for a round table discussion at the Commerce Department).
13 One of the most valuable and comprehensive volumes in the field is W. FUGATE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1973) which includes an extensive table ofsources.
Id at 577-93. For a useful overall discussion of the extraterritorial scope of the American anti-
trust laws, see ANTITRUST LAW SECTION OF THE ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 354-90
(1975). For a comparative study of extraterritorial application of antitrust laws, see EXTRATERRI-
TORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ANTITRUST LAWS,
INT'L B.J., Nov. 1974, at 51-86. See also, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST- OVER-
LAP AND CONFLICT 50-116 (J. Rahl ed. 1970).
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antitrust laws has been vigorously debated. The advocates of the "ad-
verse effect" position have complained principally of an undue drag on
export trade because of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act. 14 They claim that the American businessman is disadvantaged be-
cause other developed countries impose relatively mild antitrust sanc-
tions on their nationals. Government-backed export cartels, receiving
such subsidies as special rediscount rates, currency convertibility guar-
antees and insurance against credit and political risks, are said to pose
major obstacles to American export trade. In accordance with the "ad-
verse effect" position, a number of proposals to limit the application of
the Sherman Act have been offered in the export trade context. 15 These
14 Nearly all of the extraterritorial applications of antitrust law in areas relevant to export
trade have been under the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
The Robinson-Patman price discrimination prohibition applies only where there are goods
sold "for use, consumption, or resale" in the United States or somewhere within its territories. 15
U.S.C. § 13 (1976). No decided cases have been found in the export area probably because only
an exotic effect from a complex transaction would allow the Robinson-Patman Act to apply to
export trade.
The broker allowances and services sections of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(C)
(1976), do not have a limitation to the territory of application while § 3 of the Clayton Act dealing
with exclusive dealing arrangements, is territorially limited to the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1976). See Baysoy v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Canadian Ingersoll-
Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
Finally, § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act may reach conduct prohibited by the Sher-
man Act and the Clayton Act as well as incipient violations of either act. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
The FTC Act's jurisdictional clause, 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1976) is comparable to the Sherman Act's, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976). However, the application of the FTC Act to nondomestic transactions has
been exceedingly rare. Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944). See McManis, Questionable
Corporate Payments Abroad." An Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 215, 239-49 (1976).
Thus, the Sherman Act will continue to be the most important and the broadest applying
antitrust law in the export trade field. See COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST: OVER-
LAP AND CONFLICT 50-54 (J. Rahl ed. 1970).
15 The Williams Commission Report calls for a broadening of the Webb-Pomerene exemp-
tion. However, the Report is totally devoid of analysis in the antitrust area. "No doubt it is mere
surmise, but it is difficult to suppress the notion that not more than a handful of the members and
staff of the Commission appreciated the background and significance of the recommendations on
Webb-Pomerene." Metzger, American Foreign Trade and Investment Policyfor the 1970:r: The
Williams Commission Report, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 537, 545 (1972).
Arthur Dean believes that there are real problems in international antitrust but does not
provide analysis. 1964 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 96. Similarly, Peter Peter-
son stated without sufficient analysis that the antitrust laws "may contain inhibiting disadvantages
to many potential exporters." P. PETERSON, A FOREIGN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 36 (1972).
In general, most advocates of retention sponsor exemption on the theory that while it may not
be doing any demonstrable good, it is also not doing any demonstrable harm. In such a case, they
argue that the dollars deriving from Webb-Pomerene Associations are enough to warrant reten-
tion. 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 242 (statement of Miles Kirkpatrick).
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT OF THE
COMM. 113, 114 (1955); 1967 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 157-58 (statement of
Joseph Barr, Under Secretary of the Treasury).
Only the trade associations assert a positive need for an exemption covering the international
Antitrust and Export Trade
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proposals generally supplement and augment the exemption from the
antitrust laws that the Webb-Pomerene Act gives for qualified horizon-
tal export associations.'
6
On the other hand, many free trade advocates have argued that
antitrust exemptions in export trade are not warranted and are in fact
dangerous. Proponents of this position point out the failure of the
Webb-Pomerene exemption to expand exports. They are concerned
that broadened horizontal exemptions might permit anti-competitive
spillover in the domestic market, to the detriment of American consum-
ers. Accordingly, they would limit or repeal antitrust exemptions in
export trade. 17
scope of American antitrust law. See ANTITRUST TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES. FINAL REPORT ON U.S.
ANTITRUST LAWS AND AMERICAN EXPORTS (Feb. 26, 1974), reprinted in 1974 InternationalAnti-
trust Hearings, supra note 7, at 163; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF U.S.
ANTITRUST LAWS: AN ISSUE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC REALITY (1974), reprinted in 1974
International Antitrust Hearings at 1416.
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 61 (1976). See generally FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON WEBB-POMERENE
ASSOCIATIONS: A 50-YEAR REVIEW (1967).
17 The calls for repeal or limitation of antitrust exemptions in export trade have come from a
wide base. The Stigler Task Force called for repeal of Webb-Pomerene because it is antithetical
to the underlying theory of the Sherman Act and because of the danger of domestic spillover.
TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, reprinted in
115 CONG. REC. 15932, 15937 (1969). Thomas Kauper, the former head of the Antitrust Division
at the Dep't of Justice, does not favor antitrust exemptions unless a convincing showing can be
made that firms presently are impeded by the antitrust laws. However, all the exhaustive efforts to
uncover real impediments have had meager success. See note 164 infra. In light of EEC antitrust
enforcement and the dynamics of international trade, the assumption that raising prices and re-
stricting output will increase American export trade appears dubious. Address by Thomas E.
Kauper, Ass't Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division to N.Y. State B.A. (Jan. 24,
1973) reprintedin 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,160. See also Address by Keith J. Clearwaters,
Special Ass't to the Ass't Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division (May 4, 1973),
reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,169; Address by Donald I. Baker, Director of Policy
Planning, Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division (Jan. 24, 1973), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) T 50,161. As Baker put it:
To summarize, the United States should not pursue import policies which are blind to
our domestic needs. Overt protectionism breeds the need for more protectionism. There is a
sort of cost-push-protection spiral. Once protected, the domestic firm is even less likely to be
able to hold its own against its most efficient foreign rivals--here or abroad. By contrast,
competition-like exercise-enables one to play the game better on any field in any part of
the world.
Id Cf. 1964 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 120 (statement of Lee Loevinger,
former Ass't Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, indicates that antitrust is often
used as a smoke screen to veil business failure). Organized labor contends that the available
evidence does not support the proposition that the antitrust laws are substantially hampering ex-
port trade. Id at 138.
Sen. Hart, who chaired a number of international antitrust hearings, came to the conclusion
that the allegations of injury to American business are without substance. He supports more vig-
orous enforcement of United States antitrust laws and was in favor of other countries more closely
Northwestern Journal of
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Recently, the debate on the effect of the antitrust laws on export
trade seems to have split the ranks of the Carter Administration. Presi-
dent Carter himself has launched a new export policy which includes a
pledge to curb overly broad applications of the Sherman Act which
"unnecessarily inhibit our firms from selling abroad."' 8 President
Carter referred particularly to the uncertain legal status of foreign joint
ventures and stated that "this uncertainty can be a disincentive to ex-
ports."19 Consequently, the President undertook several initiatives in
an attempt to remedy this perceived disincentive. 20
Meanwhile, the Carter Justice Department has shown a predilec-
tion for more activity in the international antitrust field. Attorney Gen-
eral Bell has warned multinational companies that the Justice
Department will not hesitate to pursue antitrust violators beyond U.S.
borders.21 And John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division, has reaffirmed the Department's com-
mitment to extraterritorial enforcement of the antitrust laws.2 2
Plainly, the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to ex-
port trade is a matter of considerable uncertainty and confusion. This
article attempts to provide a useful analytical framework for approach-
ing the doubts over the appropriate scope of the Sherman Act's appli-
cation to U.S. export trade.
following the competitive norm. 1972 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 247. Fu-
gate agrees that Americans have more to gain than to lose by mutual agreements to give up export
cartels. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 252 (2d ed. 1973).
A few commentators, although generally against the exemption, see it warranted in special
cases. Stocking and Watkins would allow joint export associations for small companies with low
market coverage. G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 561 (1951).
Brewster generally supports repeal but leaves open the question whether exemptions could be
granted "on an ad hoc basis in special situations" to industries which could show a real need to
bargain collectively in the face of foreign restrictions. K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD 454-56 (1958).
18 Excerpts from President Carter's Sept. 26, 1978 press conference reprinted in [July-Dec.
1978 Transfer Binder] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., (BNA) No. 882, A-4, Sept. 28, 1978.
19 Id at A-5.
20 The President instructed the Justice Department, together with the Commerce Department,
"to clarify and explain the scope of the antitrust laws in this area, with special emphasis on the
kinds ofjoint ventures that are unlikely to raise antitrust problems" and "to give expedited treat-
ment to [business review] requests by business firms for guidance on international antitrust is-
sues." Id The President also appointed a business advisory panel to work with the National
Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures. See Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1978, at
20, col. 3.
21 Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1977, at 12, col. 3.
22 See Interview with John H. Shenefield, [July-Dec. Transfer Binder] ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 875, AA- to AA-8, Aug. 3, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Shenefield Interview].
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AN OVERVIEW
Horizontal Restraints of Trade
It is clear that a horizontal restrictive business practice, which
would be illegal if practiced wholly domestically, will not be counte-
nanced merely because it occurs in export trade. Taking this premise
as given, this article will demonstrate how restrictive business practices
ostensibly aimed only abroad may, nevertheless, have adverse effects
on domestic competition.
After showing the great danger of adverse effects on domestic
competition from restraints supposedly aimed only at foreigners, the
discussion will then address the ultimate policy question: whether
purely foreign injuries-assuming such purity can exist-should find
remedy under the Sherman Act. Some commentators have suggested
that, as a matter of economic protectionism, the Sherman Act should
not protect foreign buyers against horizontal restraints by American
firms who collaborate in selling abroad when such restraints are only
felt in foreign markets.23 An opposing thesis is that American export-
ers who engage in market allocation, price fixing, boycotts, and other
restraints on foreign buyers should be subject to Sherman Act regula-
tion.24
Ought the Sherman Act be protectionist? This question is best ex-
plored by means of theory. The economics of export trade demonstrate
that antitrust protectionism does not make economic sense. Armed
with the knowledge that antitrust protectionism is counter-productive,
an analysis of horizontal restrictions in export trade is offered, one that
attempts to strike an appropriate mean between the application of do-
mestic per se rules and the rule of reason to the export trade cases:
Vertical Restraints of Trade
Finally, attention will focus on vertical restraints. A normative ju-
risdictional model suggests that in the majority of the restrictive distri-
bution practice cases, which principally occur within the foreign
23 See, e.g., 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings supra note 7, at 808-09 (statement of Walker
Comegys); Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 16 (1974); Speech by Treasury Secretary Connally before the Antitrust Section of the
ABA, reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 609, A-4, April 17, 1973; K. Brew-
STER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 82 (1958); 1964InternationalAntitrust Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 27 (statement of Corwin Edwards).
24 See, e.g., Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1 (1974); Rahl, A Rejoinder, id at 42. See also I VON KALINOWsKi, ANTITRUST LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATION § 5.02 (1971); Hale & Hale, Monopoly Abroad" The Antitrust Laws and
Commerce in Foreign Areas, 31 TEX. L. REv. 493 (1953).
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market, the interests of the United States in extending the Sherman Act
to these cases are less than those of the target country.
If the goods are supplied from a third country or from an Ameri-
can subsidiary in the target country, our separately developed jurisdic-
tional model indicates that subject matter jurisdiction often does not
exist.25 But when the goods are supplied from the United States, sub-
ject matter jurisdiction can probably be maintained. 26 In addition, if
the foreign subsidiary of an American firm participates in a restrictive
distribution practice which cuts off exports by other American export-
ers to the foreign country, jurisdiction might well be found. Thus, this
article will conclude with a brief analysis of the substantative law con-
cerning restrictive distribution practices in the international context for
those cases where subject matter jurisdiction can arguably be estab-
lished.
HORIZONTAL RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES IN EXPORTING
FROM THE UNITED STATES
Substantive Law When the Effect on the Domestic Economy is Direct
and Unquestioned
Horizontal restrictive practices in export trade seem to be treated
the same way as they are in the domestic context when the adverse
effect on domestic competition is obvious. For example, "there is no
doubt"27 that a horizontal combination that manipulates prices of com-
modities in import and export trade is illegal per se.28 Nor is there any
25 Ongman, "Be No Longer a Chaos" Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's
Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 733 (1977).
26 Id.
27 Kramer, The Application ofthe Sherman Act to Foreign Commerce, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 387,
397 (1958).
28 When the import trade of the United States is implicated, it is well settled that the Sherman
Act applies and that the substantive law governing is the same as what would apply purely domes-
tically. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100 (1969); United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). See generally Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Long
Islard Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 521 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1974); Occidental Petro-
leum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Interamerican Refining
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F.Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
However, when only the export trade of the United States is involved the application of the
Sherman Act is more complex. Reading the dicta literally, Socony- Vacuum establishes that price
fixing is per se illegal. "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in . . .
foreign commerce is illegal per se." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223
(1940). "And the amount of. . . foreign trade involved is not material." Id at 224 n.59. Cf.
United States v. Learner, 215 F. Supp. 603, 605 (D. Haw. 1968). Indeed, as early as 1918, it was
felt an exemption for joint export selling entities from the Sherman Act was required, causing the
Webb-Pomerene Act to be passed. Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. § 61 (1971). And in Pfizer, Inc. v.
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question that an allocation of territories in a horizontal combination of
firms is illegal if the United States is one of the allocated territories.2 9
In addition, if competing American firms combine to reduce or elimi-
nate exports to some parts of the world in favor of sales in those mar-
kets from their foreign manufacturing plants, an illegal restraint will be
found.30 When the effect on the domestic economy is direct and un-
questioned, the substantive law applied seems to be the same as that
applied to purely domestic cases.3'
Substantive Law *hen the Restraints and Their Adverse Effects are
Purportedly Directed Strictly at Foreign Markets
The Cases. Several recent cases have opted for substantive Sher-
man Act coverage to provide a remedy for foreign buyers who are in-
jured by horizontal restraints in export sales entered into by
collaborating American firms. In State of Kuwait v. Charles Pfizer &
Co. ,32 Kuwait sued to collect treble damages for price fixing in a sale of
broad spectrum antibiotics. Because the antitrust violation included
price fixing in the United States which affected American consumers,
the extraterritorial aspects of the case were not essential to its resolu-
tion.
Nevertheless, in denying Pfizer's motion to dismiss, the court in
effect stated that, as a matter of substantive law, injury from a horizon-
tal restraint by American exporters could never be confined to a foreign
country:
A conspiracy among domestic producers of antibiotic drugs to reduce
or eliminate competition as to foreign sales would certainly have an ad-
India, 434 U.S. 308, 313 n.11 (1978), the Supreme Court stated that "it is established that the
antitrust laws apply to exports as well." Nevertheless, a full analysis of the impact of the Sherman
Act on export trade reveals that the problem of antitrust and export trade is a sophisticated one.
29 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
30 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950). However,
where a multinational company has unilaterally set up foreign manufacturing subsidiaries which
sell products only in a designated territory rather than in territories allocated with a competitor
which it may (or may not) have later acquired, an antitrust violation should not be found. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, ANTITRUST Div., ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,
reprinted in [1977] 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 266 at 12 [hereinafter cited as GUIDE].
31 Cases testing the Webb-Pomerene exemption are founded on the theory that price fixing
and allocation of export sales violate the Sherman Act if they are outside the exemption. See, e.g.,
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968).
32 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). But c Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976) (foreign government not permitted to sue in parenspatriae for
antitrust injury to its citizens, rather they must sue in their individual capacities or as a class). For
a case where a horizontal market allocation was held illegal, even though the effect was purport-
edly only in foreign markets, see United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642, 647
(S.D.N.Y. 1944).
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verse effect on domestic competition. Not only would it enable the do-
mestic manufacturers to build up a substantial 'war chest' from excessive
profits from foreign sales but such a conspiracy might prevent either a
domestic or a foreign manufacturer from entering into the foreign market
in order to build up its strength to enter into the restricted domestic mar-
ket. In an age of expanding world trade, a truly successful monopoly
requires control of both domestic and foreign markets. For these reasons,
this court is convinced that the fundamental goal of the antitrust laws
could be seriously frustrated by not permitting Kuwait to maintain a
treble damage action for damages resulting from the alleged conspiracy.33
While the facts of State of Kuwait made it unnecessary to consider
whether an antitrust injury entirely confined to a foreign country could
support a Sherman Act violation, more recently a district court has
reached this issue. In Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. ,34 a district court held that the Sherman Act could be applied to
grant relief to a foreign corporation for damage to its business in a
foreign country. Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. was a Bahamian wholesale
distributor of liquor and beer. In direct competition with Todhunter-
Mitchell in the large scale distribution of alcoholic beverages, Bahama
Blenders, Ltd. was given an exclusive distributorship of Anheuser-
Busch products in the Bahamas. Anheuser-Busch wholesalers in
Miami and New Orleans, at the direction of Anheuser-Busch, refused
to supply Todhunter with Anheuser-Busch products. As a result, there
was no intrabrand price competition in Anheuser-Busch products in
the Bahamas. 35 However, the "business potential" for export from the
United States to the Bahamas by other manufacturers of beer was not
33 333 F. Supp. at 316-17. State of Kuwait was appealed to the Eighth Circuit but the appeal
was dismissed when Kuwait withdrew its claim. Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 311 n.5 (1978).
See also Petitioners Joint Reply Brief in support of their Petition for Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, at 3 n.3, Pfizer, Inc. v. India. However, other
consolidated Antibiotic Antitrust cases of which State ofKuwait was a part were affirmed both in
the Eighth Circuit, 550 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976), and in the Supreme Court, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
The issue before the Supreme Court in Pfizer v. India was limited to the question of whether a
foreign nation was a person within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court decision supports the analysis of the State ofKuwait opinion. See text accompa-
nying notes 48-49, infra. Indeed the Court cited with approval an article which outlined the "spill-
over" problem outlined in the State of Kuwait decision:
It has been suggested that depriving foreign plaintiffs of a treble-damages remedy and
thus encouraging illegal conspiracies would affect American consumers in other ways as well:
by raising worldwide prices and thus contributing to American inflation; by discouraging
foreign entrants who might undercut monopoly prices in this country; and by allowing viola-
tors to accumulate a "war chest" of monopoly profits to police domestic cartels and defend
them from legal attacks.
434 U.S. at 315 n.14 (citing Velvel, Antitrust Suits by Foreign Nations, 25 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1, 7-8
(1975)).
34 375 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa.), findings partially amended, 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
See Note, 10 TEx. INT'L L.J. 579 (1975).
35 383 F. Supp. at 587.
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reduced.36 Therefore the injury could be viewed as falling solely in the
Bahamas. 3
7
The Todhunter-Mitchell court fully opted in favor of that thesis:
The Court is in substantial agreement with the defendant's contention
that the ultimate result of the restraint imposed on the Miami and New
Orleans wholesalers is the elimination of competition in the Bahama Is-
lands. However, the territorial restraints imposed upon the Miami and
New Orleans distributors directly affected the flow of foreign commerce
out of this country. Restraints which directly affect the flow of foreign
commerce into or out of this country are subject to the provisions of Sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act.38
And in another recent case, Industria Siciliana Asfal4 Bitumi,
S.p.A. v. Exxon Research and Engineering Co.,39 (Exxon) a district
court extended the Todhunter ruling from the export of goods to the
export of services as well. The Exxon court held that a foreign corpo-
ration doing no business in the United States could sue under the Sher-
man Act for injury "confined" to a foreign country. Industria Siciliana
Asfalti, Bitumi (ISAB) was an Italian company formed to erect and
operate a petroleum refinery in Italy. Two American companies, Uni-
versal Oil Products (UOP) and Exxon Research and Engineering
(ERE) offered ISAB competing proposals for the refinery's design, en-
gineering and associated technology licensing. Although UOP offered
the lowest bid, the ERE proposal was chosen, allegedly because ERE's
parent, Exxon Corporation, acting through its subsidiaries, improperly
applied its economic power to coerce ISAB.
36 This holding goes beyond the point where some distinguished antitrust commentators begin
to become uneasy. They would limit Sherman Act application to those cases where, although the
effects of the restraint supposedly fall abroad, it is reasonable to presume an effect on domestic
competition.
Kingman Brewster's views are representative. He agrees that "[1oose agreements govern-
ing price, output, or territories for export would seem to fall under the Sherman Act ban," but
only if the "business potential" of exporters in the United States would be lessened. K. BREW-
STER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 105, 134 (1958). "Even a naked restraint on
foreign local or 'third-market' commerce would seem subject to liability if, and only if, the govern-
ment could prove the effect on competition in United States domestic or foreign commerce." Id
at 82 (spillover).
37 In State ofKuwait there was a horizontal combination of competing firms. Interbrand com-
petition thereby was lessened. The effect in the United States might be felt in two ways. First,
other American drug companies, not parties to the combination, would be excluded from an ex-
port market by entry barriers. Second, the combining firms' collective behavior in foreign markets
might well spill over to domestic markets. Cf. Davidow, 4ntitrust, Foreign Policy, and Interna-
tional Buying Cooperation, 84 YALE L.J. 268, 276-77 (1974). However, in Todhunter-Mitchell,
intrabrand competition was lessened. Thus, neither of the putative effects above would be felt in
the United States.
38 383 F.Supp. at 587.
39 1977-1 Trade Cas. 70,775 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1977).
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Again, in Exxon as in Todhunter, the quantum of export trade
from the United States was not lessened, although the competition in
export trade was adversely affected.40 The defendants moved to dis-
miss on the grounds that "since ISAB is an Italian corporation, not
engaged in 'business with the United States, and which suffered the
averred damage in Italy, then its injury falls without United States
commerce, thereby removing it from the protection of our antitrust
statutes. ' 4I The court denied the motion to dismiss on this ground. In
so doing, the court noted that the alleged reciprocal dealing consisted
of two evils: "the foreclosure of competition from a particular market
and the imposition upon a buyer of either an unwanted product, or a
desired product on unacceptable terms.42
Consequently, the court held that a domestic restraint of trade and
a foreign restraint could not be distinguished and that as a consequence
the Sherman Act should apply to the "Italian" injury.
Plaintiff is not precluded from raising this domestic restraint of trade [en-
gaged in by the Exxon group] in support of its own case because its 'in-
jury', in defendants' view, can in a theoretical sense be confined to Italy.
Such is not the case. As previously stated, when coercion is present in a
reciprocal relationship, the antitrust injury experienced by the buyer-vic-
tim is comprised of both the foreclosure and imposition aspects of that
anticompetitive practice, and consequently, the foreign plaintiff is not
without standing to cite the deleterious domestic effects in support of his
own antitrust complaint. In so doing, the foreign plaintiff is not asserting
the rights of third parties, but his own, since the 'imposition' which it has
suffered is inextricably bound up with the domestic restraints of trade which
have enabled the defendant to enforce the reciprocal transaction upon the
plaintiff.4 3 (Emphasis added).
But undoubtedly the most important recent development in the
international antitrust area is the Supreme Court's decision in Pfizer
Inc. v. India,44 which addresses the problem of extending Sherman Act
protection to anticompetitive practices regardless of the fact that they
are confined to a foreign nation. In Pfizer, the Supreme Court held in a
five to three decision that a foreign country otherwise entitled to sue in
American courts was a "person" under the Sherman Act.45
Apparently, the question which divided the majority and the dis-
sent was whether the framers of the Sherman Act intended to make
40 Id
41 Id at 70,783.
42 Id The case was dismissed on the alternative ground that ISAB had not adequately
pleaded that it had been coerced through the oppressive use of market power. Id at 70,782.
43 Id at 70,783-84.
44 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
45 Id
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treble damages available solely to American consumers, or to foreign
consumers as well. However, on closer inspection it becomes clear that
the Court's disagreement was even more fundamental. In their analy-
sis, the dissenters emphasize who, in fact, was injured by the restraint.
Thus, noting that the injured party was a foreigner, and pointing to
evidence of economic protectionism in the Webb-Pomerene Act and in
the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the dissenters concluded that
the Sherman Act does not protect foreigners from this type of injury.
In contrast, Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, rather
than focusing on the identity of the injured consumer, emphasized the
premier importance of maintaining competition in export trade.46 The
court proposed that the "alternate purposes of the antitrust laws" were
best served by focusing analysis on injury to, rather than on the identity
of, the injured party for two principal reasons. First, foreign anticom-
petitive practices may spill over into American markets and extending
treble damages increases the deterrent against injury to American mar-
kets.
If foreign plaintiffs were not permitted to seek a remedy for their antitrust
injuries, persons doing business both in this country and abroad might be
tempted to enter into anticompetitive conspiracies affecting American
consumers in the expectation that the illegal profits they could safely ex-
46 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws, may sue therefore in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
The notion that the Sherman Act protects competition rather than consumers qua consumers
was first introduced by Professor James A. Rahl. Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the
American Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 526 (1975).
The Justice Department's Antitrust Guidefor International Operations has suggested that en-
forcement of the Sherman Act should only be extended to foreign restraints which spill over into
the domestic market and to restraints of American export and foreign investment opportunities.
GUIDE, supra note 30, at 4-6. Professor Rahl has noted the practical problems that this test raises
because of the nearly certain spillover of foreign restraints onto the American domestic market.
But more importantly, Professor Rahl fundamentally disagrees with the Guide's theory:
It assumes that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to guard the interests of American consum-
ers and of American sellers and investors against restraints which would impose upon them
additional costs or other detriments. But I have always understood the purpose of the anti-
trust laws to be to protect competition in the commerce, domestic and foreign, regulated by
Congress, on the theory that this will promote efficiency, better allocation of resources and
economic progress. Restraints of competition are to be prevented in our foreign commerce,
as in our domestic, not because this gives short-run help to some group of consumers or
entrepreneurs, but because it is our choice of policies as to how commerce should be con-
ducted. It thus does not matter who the victim of the restraint would be or the beneficiary of
the prohibition. What matters is the value of the competitive process itself to the commerce
involved.
Rahl, Antitrust andInternational Transactions-Recent Developments, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 965, 969
(1977).
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tort abroad would offset any liability to plaintiffs at home. If, on the other
hand, potential antitrust violators must take into account the full costs of
their conduct, American consumers are benefited by the maximum deter-
rent effect of treble damages upon all potential violators.47
But secondly, the court noted that, wholly apart from spillover ef-
fects, to deny an injured foreign plaintiff the right to sue under the
Sherman Act would defeat its purpose. "It would permit a price fixer
• ..to escape full liability for his illegal actions and would deny com-
pensation to certain of his victims, merely because he happens to deal
with foreign customers. '48
State of Kuwait, as affirmed by Pfizer v. India, Todhunter-Mitchell,
and Exxon, thus naturally suggests a format for analyzing whether the
extension of the Sherman Act to these situations should be legislatively
reversed. Opponents of such broad application of the Sherman Act to
export trade argue that, as a matter of policy, restraints of trade causing
injuries solely in foreign markets should be beyond American concern.
In essence, the argument is one for economic protectionism; so long as
the injury falls abroad, anticompetitive practices should be allowed in
U.S. export trade.
This argument may be met at two levels. First, it may be shown
that the assumption that the injury falls only abroad is erroneous. State
of Kuwait, as affirmed by Pfizer v. India, is an example of the class of
cases in which an adverse effect from the horizontal restraint may be
presumed to be felt domestically. Second, the wisdom of economic
protectionism in the international application of the Sherman Act may
be dealt with frontally. Todhunter-Mitchell and Exxon, representing
the class of cases where the horizontal restraint may have no domestic
impact, provide an opportunity to assess the wisdom of economic pro-
tectionism in antitrust policy.
Do Horizontal Restrictive Practices AimedAbroad Result in Injuries
Which Fall Only in Those Foreign Markets? State of Kuwait, as af-
firmed by Pfizer v. India, offers two theories to justify the expectation of
an adverse effect on competition in American interstate or foreign com-
merce even though the restraint is ostensibly directed strictly at a for-
eign market. Either the foreign cooperation could "spill over" into the
domestic market or the cooperation could erect a barrier to entry into
the foreign market against American exporters not parties to the com-
bination.49
47 434 U.S. at 315.
48 Id at 314-15.
49 See generally Hale & Hale, Monopoly Abroad" The Anitrust Laws and Commerce in For-
Antitrust and Export Trade
1:163(1979)
The operation of these two theories may be tested against the data
gleaned from the operation of Webb-Pomerene associations. Webb-
Pomerene associations are provided a horizontal antitrust exemption if
the effect of the restraint falls abroad.50 Thus, the Webb-Pomerene ex-
perience can help us assess the realism of the assertion that the effects
of restraints aimed abroad may in fact be contained within foreign
markets.
Turning first to the spillover theory, Webb-Pomerene critics have
argued that exporting, by its very operation, reduces domestic supply.
Under classical economic theory, a decrease in supply in a fixed-capac-
ity market raises the price of a demand-elastic commodity. 5' Axiomati-
cally, the implication is that horizontal restrictive practices will
necessarily affect domestic prices.52
The inevitable domestic consequences of horizontal combinations
in export are explicitly recognized in the legislative history of the
Webb-Pomerene Act.53 However, these inevitable consequences have
eign Areas, 31 TEx. L. REv. 493, 519-23 (1953). It is illuminating to note that spillover and the
raising of market barriers invalidate the Webb-Pomerene exemption as well. The operative provi-
sion of the Act provides that nothing in the Sherman Act shall be construed to make illegal:
(1) An association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade and
actually engaged solely in such export trade; or
(2) an agreement made or act done in the course of such export trade by such associa-
tion; provided that:
(a) such association, agreement or act is not in restraint of trade within the
United States; and
(b) such association, agreement or act is not in restraint of the export trade of
any domestic competitor of such association; and
(c) such association does not, either in the United States or elsewhere, enter
into any agreement, understanding, or conspiracy, or do any act which
(i) artificially or intentionally enhances or depresses prices within the United
States of commodities of the class exported by such association, or
(ii) substantially lessens competition within the United States, or
(iii) otherwise restrains trade within the United States.
See 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1970).
50 See generally Editorial Note, The Webb-Pomerene Act: Some New Developments in a Quies-
cent History, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 341 (1968).
51 J. Rahl, Cases and Materials on Antitrust Law (multilithed), chap. 3 (1975). The classic
treatise in price theory is STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE (3d ed. 1966).
52 See Diamond, The Webb-Pomerene Act and Export Trade Associations, 44 COLUM. L. REV.
805, 827 (1944); Fournier, The Purposes and Results of the Webb-Pomerene Law, 22 AM. ECON.
REv. 18, 19 (1932); Comment, Export Combinations and the Antitrust Laws: The Dilemma ofthe
Webb-PomereneAct, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 654, 659-61 (1950) [hereinafter cited as CHICAGO com-
ment]; Investigation of Concentration of Econ. Power: Hearings Before the Senate Temporary Na-
tionalEconomic Comm, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 25 at 13037, 13158 (1940); Allison, Antitrust and
Foreign Trade: Exemptionfor Export Associations, 11 Hous. L. REv. 1124, 1138 (1974); 1967
International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 127 (statement of Donald Turner).
53 Senator Cummins insisted: "it is utterly impossible to disassociate the activity of an associ-
ation organized for export trade and the industries carried on for consumption within the United
States." 56 CONG. REc. 175 (1917). In addition, the Senate Report on the bill realized "that any
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been held not to be an "unlawful restraint" under the Webb-Pomerene
Act 54 which, literally read, does not exempt export trade associations
with such effects. 55
Ignoring such inevitable effects may be economically justifiable.
Absent any intentional depression of prices within the United States,
price fluctuations should equilibrate about a norm with only a small
variance from the price median.5 6 If an undue amount of supply is
channeled into exports, the marginal price increases will correspond to
marginal enhancement of the market share of the industry competitors
who are not overexporting.57 Assuming that the profits from foreign
trade are lower than domestic trade because of more expensive trans-
portation, finance and marketing costs, the overexporting firm will lose
more money from the loss of domestic profits in its shrinking domestic
marginal sales volume than will be offset from its increasing foreign
marginal sales volume.5 8
Thus, there is a correcting market mechanism against uninten-
tional overexporting. As a result, it is proper to ignore these inevitable
domestic effects in deciding whether restraints ostensibly aimed abroad
have sufficient domestic effects to suggest that domestic Sherman Act
substantive tests should be applied.
However, this mechanism will be inoperative if there is a substan-
tial over-capacity in the market. If substantial volume cannot be ab-
sorbed by the domestic market, export of this surplus would preserve a
price structure that would be depressed if the excess capacity were
dumped on the domestic market.5 9
sales in foreign commerce may incidentally and temporarily result in the increase in prices of the
same articles to home consumers." S. REP. No. 1056, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1917).
54 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 965 (D. Mass. 1950).
55 See note 22 supra.
56 See generally Weiner, Expanding Small Firm Exports in the United States, 6 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 355 (1972).
57 This, of course, assumes workable competition. If the combination is oligopolistic or if
market coverage of its members in the product is otherwise nearly total, the counterforce will not
exist because there are no non-combining market members. Due to the conscious parallelism in
such markets, discussion of these markets is deferred to the intentional spillover section of this
article. See also Diamond, supra note 52, at 827.
58 Indeed the primary importance of participating in the domestic market is seen as the princi-
pal component in the inertia with respect to increased exporting.
59 To succeed in such domestic price support, a combination must have control over domestic
supply and the exports in the product. The sulphur and alkali industries, in which domestic price
supports were implemented through Webb-Pomerene Associations, met these prerequisites. FTC,
THE SULPHUR INDUSTRY AND INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 14, 95 (1947); FTC, REPORT ON INTER-
NATIONAL CARTELS IN THE ALKALI INDUSTRY 50, 89-96 (1950).
The self-correcting mechanism might also be short-circuited if a Webb-Pomerene member is
controlled by foreign interests who compete in the associations product. Such a result is appar-
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Such a market structure came under attack in United States v.
United States Alkali Export Ass'n60 (Alkasso). In Alkasso, the export
market represented only five to seven percent of the caustic soda in the
United States. Nevertheless, the stabilization of the domestic price
structure by dumping excess industry capacity abroad was held to be a
violation of the Sherman Act. 6 ' The Alkasso court appreciated that it
was interference with domestic market mechanisms that should be con-
demned. "[A]ny agreement for the purchase of 'distress' or surplus ma-
terial amounting to a small percentage of the total product where it is
shown that such practice would materially interfere with the free in-
terchange of those competitive forces which ultimately determine the
commodity's going price [is illegal]." '62
In a market with over-capacity, selective export abroad can inter-
fere with the domestic market. Therefore, it is appropriate to suspect
that a restraint purportedly aimed only at foreign markets can have a
domestic market effect.
Generally, "spillover" suggests a collusive, rather than just a stabi-
lized, domestic price structure as a result of cooperation in export trade.
The argument runs that if cooperation in export trade is allowed, simi-
lar activity will eventually be practiced in the domestic markets. 63
ently allowed by a recent FTC advisory opinion that a domestic corporation owned or controlled
by foreign interests may join a Webb-Pomerene association. 11973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. RE'. (CCH) 20,491.
60 86 F. Supp. 59, 77-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
61 Whether dumping, in the technical sense of selling abroad at lower prices than at home,
hurts domestic consumers is a complex question that probably is intractible when stated generally.
See Hale & Hale, MonopoAbroad The Antitrust Laws and Commerce in Foreign Areas, 31 TEX.
L. REv. 493, 517 n.82 (1953). However, "where the object of dumping is to maintain full produc-
tion without reducing domestic prices below the point of maximum profit," injury to domestic
consumers is no longer problematical. J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 102 (1966).
62 86 F. Supp. at 80.
63 Mason, Consensus Report on the Webb-Pomerene Law, 37 AM. ECON. REV. 848, 853, 862
(1947); Simmons, Webb-tPomerene Act andAntitrust Policy, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 426, 440; CHICAGO
Comment, supra note 52, at 660-62; 1967 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 124, 128
(statement of Ass't Attorney General Donald Turner). The mechanism of spillover was aptly
described by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD):
Thus, the side effect of most pure export cartels may be a restraint of domestic competi-
tion mainly through conscious parallelism. This is all the more likely when it is realised [sic]
that many export agreements probably impose a cost on the parties concerned in the form of
exports foregone. Not only will the price rigidity imposed by an export agreement tend to
prevent member firms from meeting foreign competition but the agreed price level itself will
tend to reflect some average of the costs of all members rather than those of the most efficient
members. If the more efficient firms incur losses in export markets the assumption must be
made that they obtain compensating advantages on the domestic market by means of the
restraints of competition previously mentioned.
REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, OECD, EXPORT
CARTELS 50 (1974).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 1:163(1979)
The possibility for collusive spillover into the domestic market is
especially present in horizontal export combinations formed under the
Webb-Pomerene Act.64 Although there is no common pattern of activ-
ity, Webb-Pomerene associations were meant to operate as a simple
sales agency with all exports made in the name of the association.
Under the exemption, the association would then set prices and divide
up markets. 65 The thesis has been offered that "[s]ince the domestic
market is the larger and more important market, certainly production
64 Judge Wyzanski recognized this possibility for collusion in Minnesota Mining, 92 F. Supp.
at 963. "The intimate association of the principal American producers in day-to-day manufactur-
ing operations, their exchange of patent licenses and industrial know-how, and their common
experience in marketing and fixing prices may inevitably reduce their zeal for competition interse
in the American Market." Id Thus collusive spillover could activate the interstate commerce
clause of the Sherman Act. Id
The danger is that the Webb-Pomerene exemption permits the sharing between members of
future price, cost and production data. These are the very data which can be utilized to support
parallel pricing in domestic markets. Note, An.Appraisalofthe Webb-Pomerene Act, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 341, 375-76 (1969) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U. Note]. Of course, such conscious parallelism
in oligopolistic markets has practical effects identical to price fixing, but it is virtually impossible
to attack under the antitrust laws. See Turner, The Defnition ofAgreement Under the Sherman
Act." Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655-63 (1962). But see In the
Matter of Kellogg Co. et al. (Complaint Jan. 24, 1972); Wilson, The FTC's Deconcentration Case
Against the Breakfast-Cereal Industry" 4 New 'Ballgame' In Antitrust, 4 ANTITRUST L. & EcON.
REV. 57 (1971) (conscious parallelism not needed to make out violation of § 5 of the FTC Act).
Further, it is significant that almost every Webb-Pomerene association (WPA) industry also
has a domestic trade association. Indeed, the WPA's and the domestic trade associations often
operate out of the same office. See Larson Thesis, infra note 67, at 24.
Therefore, the possibility also exists of American cooperating firms consciously paralleling
the price structure of their foreign "rivals." The historical evidence developed by the Webb-
Pomerene associations establishes that between 1924 and 1950 international cartels operated in
such diverse commodities as copper, steel, abrasives, alkalis, oil, and sulphur with American mem-
bers participating through their WPA's. It is not unrealistic to think that American cooperation,
especially in oligopolistic markets, could be used as a tool for what Larson calls the achievement
of "peaceful coexistence" with foreign rivals. Id at 113-17.
65 FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: A 50-YEAR REVIEW 28-30,
48-49 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FTC 50-YEAR REVIEW]. Many other functions have been as-
sumed by WPA's such as:
an export sales agent; employing or directing the export sales agents of members; establishing
terms and policies of sale, together with uniform contract forms; allocating export business;
price fixing; buying for resale; product standardization, including tailoring of the grade or
style of the product for foreign tastes or pocketbooks; arranging group-insurance, cargo space
and freight rates; collecting trade information; storing members' products here or abroad to
avoid market glutting; mass liquidating of, or bartering for, blocked foreign currency; credit
investigation; representation for claims of customers; promotion of trade conferences and
agreements; and joint representation before foreign governments on legislation effecting [sic]
the association's trade. The association may perform all or only a few of these functions.
Note, Webb-Pomerene vs. Foreign Economic Policy, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1201 (1951). See also
1967 InternationalAntirust Hearings, supra note 7, at 43 (statement of Willard F. Mueller). How-
ever, the associations qua associations only export about 2% of total U.S. exports. Id Most of the
Webb-Pomerene associations operating now do not actually ship the product and fix the price and
terms and conditions of sales of the member's products abroad. 1973 International.ntitrust Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 311.
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and domestic sales and prices could not be neglected in any discussion
that the Export Corporation's directors might have had about foreign
market prices and policies. '66
This thesis-that collusive spillover exists as a result of some
Webb-Pomerene activities-has been empirically verified in case stud-
ies of sulphur, copper, and other Webb-Pomerene associations. 67 Each
group has been disbanded in the recent past for a short period and then
has been reconstituted. The period when there was no export associa-
tion can thus serve as a control period. By comparing the structure,
conduct, and performance of the industry during the control period
against the period when the association is functional, one may infer
whether domestic spillover has occurred as a result of the horizontal
combination authorized under the Webb-Pomerene Act.68 Since the
circumstances are similar in all of these industries, the sulphur industry
will be discussed as a representative example.
The sulphur industry is a very tight oligopoly. Four firms control
the entire U.S. industry and the American industry dominates the
world market. The two largest firms each control about forty-five per-
cent of the market while the smaller two firms share the remaining
market nearly equally.69 However, smaller firms lease their mines from
the largest, allowing the latter to control the output of the smaller
firms.70 There is no competitive fringe whatever to the American mar-
ket.7 t
66 M. LINDAHL & W. CARTER, CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 296 (3d ed.
1959). But see Hearings Before Temporary National Economic Comm., supra note 52, at 13158
(1940).
67 The ensuing discussion of the sulphur industry is based on an unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion in economics submitted to the University of Maryland. D. Larson, An Economic Analysis of
the Webb-Pomerene Act (1968) [hereinafter cited as Larson Thesis] (page numbers referred to in
the dissertation are those found in an authorized facsimile published on request by the author
from University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan). A shorter version of the thesis appears
as Larson, An Economic Analysis of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 13 J. L. & ECON. 461 (1970). For a
similar documentation of domestic effect in the copper industry, see Curry Thesis, infra note 113,
at 229-31. For a discussion of domestic effect in the carbon black industry, see 1967 International
Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 146.
68 For the sulphur industry's version of the facts, see 1967 International Antitrust Hearings,
supra note 7, at 277-79 (letter from Sulphur Export Corp. to Sen. Hart, July 27, 1967). The letter
mainly tries to rebut a causal connection between Sulexco and the British buying cartel. In surre-
buttal, see the statement of a member of Nader's group on corporate responsibility, 1972 Interna-
tional Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 785.
69 Larson Thesis, supra note 67, at 146-48.
70 Id at 148.
71 Entry barriers are severe. Absolute costs of production, stockpiling of reserves by market
members which could be used in a price war against a new entrant, the time required to get new
operations producing and the high degree of diversification of the market members allowing them
to absorb losses in the sulphur wing of the business all are substantial barriers. The real "brick
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Compounding the anticompetitive effect of the virtual duopoly
held by the two largest firms is the fact that sulphur is a highly price-
inelastic product. Sulphur has the paradigm characteristics for price
inelasticity: a homogeneous product with no suitable substitutes for
most of its end uses.72 Indeed, the data confirms that prices have
shown little response to short run perturbations in supply and de-
mand.73
Progenitors of Sulexco, a trade association of sulphur companies,
have demonstrated a propensity towards international cartelization. 74
However, in 1952, Sulexco was disbanded because no competition ex-
isted for its members.75 All four of the constituent companies contin-
ued to export, with the two small firms actually increasing their exports.
This showed that Sulexco did not promote scale economies or protec-
tion from foreign cartels. 76
In 1958, at a time when the sulphur market had excess supply,
Sulexco was reorganized because of the emergence of Mexican compe-
tition deriving from newly discovered sulphur deposits. 77 From 1952 to
wall", however, is the fact that existing firms control all known American sulphur mines. The
only known deposits of sulphur of a grade which can be processed at a price competitive with
American sulphur are in Mexico and are controlled by interests not inclined to compete with the
American producers. Any further sulphur that may be found would probably be discovered in the
United States. However, sulphur deposits are found in the course of oil exploration by oil compa-
nies. But these oil firms give control of the mines to the existing sulphur producers on a royalty
basis. Royalty payments are 50-75% of net profits from sulphur sold and, in addition, the oil
companies have taken the 23% depletion allowance that has been allowed for sulphur.
In short, the only potential entrants to the market would seem to be the oil companies them-
selves. But it would not make good business sense for the oil companies to jeopardize high royal-
ties, with no risk to themselves, in order to create competition in the market. This is especially
true since the major oil companies are oligopolists themselves with a tendency to maintain the
status quo. Larson Thesis, supra note 67, at 150-52. But see 1973 InternationalAnitrust Hearings,
supra note 7, at 380.
72 Given high concentration, product homogeneity is worse than differentiation. Although
price can be fixed (ie., by a Webb-Pomerene association) in both cases, at least in the case of
differentiation there can still be competition on non-price grounds. With homogeneity, no
field of competition is left once price competition is eliminated. Inelasticity makes the situa-
tion still worse because it implies a lack of good substitutes for the product. This lack gives
association members more room to raise prices without losing business.
Larson Thesis, supra note 67, at 192. This is particularly true for sulphur because its cost is usu-
ally a small fraction of the total cost of the finished manufactured product.
73 Id at 161, 167.
74 FTC, THE SULPHUR INDUSTRY AND INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 1-105 (1947). See also Lar-
son Thesis, spra note 67, at 154-55, 168-69.
75 Larson Thesis, supra note 67, at 168.
76 Id at 171.
77 Id The Mexican producers simply undercut the American producer price. The domestic
effect was dramatic. No sulphur was exported from Mexico to the United States in 1954. But by
1957, U.S. imports rose to 464,000 long tons or approximately 10% of the domestic supply. W.
HAYNES, BRIMSTONE: THE STONE THAT BURNS 286 (1959).
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1958, the control period, prices, and profits fell for the four American
producers as their share of the world sulphur supply declined. In re-
sponse to the Mexican competition, one of the large firms decreased the
domestic price of sulphur by an unprecedented eleven percent. 78 The
other large producer immediately followed by lowering ,he domestic
and export price of its sulphur.79 This was a move which "jolted the
sulphur market and started prices on a steep slide; by '63 they were off
30% from the '56 level."80
Since the reorganization of Sulexco in 1958, prices and profit rates
have stabilized. 8' In addition, since the reorganization, there has been
no new market entry even though profit rates are high.82 The associa-
tion greatly facilitated dealing with the Mexican threat. Only two Mex-
ican producers existed: one was a corporation controlled by Texas oil
and gas interests, and the other was one of the large American produc-
ers. After Sulexco was reformed, the domestic producer withdrew from
Mexico leaving the Mexican market as a virtual monopoly. After this
withdrawal, the remaining firm started pricing policies which were par-
allel to Sulexco's. 83
Professor Larson has suggested that the disappearance of price
competition in a price-inelastic product is to be expected when a tight
horizontal combination exists:
In industries producing basic industrial inputs, price cuts most often
take the form of absorbing shipping and storage charges. These price de-
creases tend to spread to overt price declines if excess supply continues.
Given inelastic demand, all firms tend to lose. The association is admir-
ably suited to preventing the spread of price cutting. In exports it com-
78 Piombino, TGS Takes Off, CHEMICAL WEEK, June 27, 1964, at 104.
79 In an oligopolistic market with inelastic product demand, total revenue falls when price is
lowered. Texas Gulf Sulphur's decrease was immediately followed against the better judgments
of the other industry members. Larson Thesis, supra note 67, at 149. Indeed, when prices were
lowered in response to Mexican competition, total industry revenues fell. Id
80 Ozimek, Sulphur." SpecialReport, CHEMICAL WEEK, September 12, 1964, at 76. The emer-
gence of the new Mexican supply broke the American grip on the free world's sulphur supply.
From a level of 80% in 1954, to a level of 61% in 1958, the U.S. share finally stabilized in 1962 at
about 50%. Larson Thesis, supra note 67, at 172.
81 Upon the reappearance of Sulexco, price competition ended among the oligopolists. In
1960, Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) announced the closing of a Mexican plant which had only been
open since 1957, and not a ton of sulphur produced there had been sold. At the same time that
TGS closed its Mexican plant, the overwhelmingly dominant Mexican producer began announc-
ing pricing parallel and equivalent to Sulexco. This parallel pricing "signaled the end of a five
year price war set off by Pan American [the Mexican company] itself in 1956 when it launched
what turned out to be a highly successful invasion of world sulphur markets." New Fire in
Brimstone, BARRON'S, Mar. 20, 1961, at I1.
82 By 1966, all of the oligopolists were earning a return on investment after taxes of close to
20%. Sulphur Search is On, CHEMICAL WEEK, May 21, 1966, at 27.
83 Larson Thesis, supra note 67, at 173-77.
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pletely eliminates the possibility. Only the association exports.
Consequently, no one firm can absorb shipping or storage costs. All or
none must do so. Price shading is most apt to occur overseas first (where
it is easier to mask with transportation costs than it is domestically) which
makes the role of the export association particularly important. Cutting
prices off list in domestic markets is detected much more readily because
of the small number of firms comprising the industry and their close geo-
graphical proximity. Moreover, the association facilitates price collabora-
tion domestically. There is far less chance that conscious parallelism will
break down if there exists a formal cartel in exports. The presence of
Sulexco reduces uncertainty for every firm.84
The sulphur industry clearly presents a severe market structure.
The horizontal combination is in a tight oligopoly with a homogeneous
price-inelastic product where the combination has a very large share of
the world supply. But, more generally, reporting uncertainty is reduced
in horizontal combinations in less tightly oligopolistic industries.
Firms tend to shade off list price if there is oversupply.8 5 Without the
association where formal reporting requirements can be enforced, only
tacit agreements can be used to try to prevent price shad-
ing-agreements which are much easier to circumvent than cartel-like
reporting requirements. 86 In addition, the association permits an ex-
plicit allocation of supply which has substantial domestic effects on an
industry with substantial over-capacity.8 7
Thus, the sulphur industry serves as a detailed example of the
mechanics and motivation for anticompetitive spillover from export
trade to the domestic market caused by oligopolistic cooperation. To
the extent that the market structure of an oligopolistic industry ap-
proaches that of the sulphur industry, the basis for suspecting domestic
collusive spillover is increased. 88
84 Id at 182-83. Indeed price shadings are very similar for all four firms. Id. at 159.
85 Larson gives three reasons for shade-offs. First, firms can use a list price as a point of
reference and regulate the amount of shading to correspond to changes in demand. The use of a
list price saves the trouble of frequent reprinting of price catalogs. Second, a higher domestic list
price would help to prevent the impression that the domestic firms were gouging foreign buyers.
Third, a high but shaded list price would allow producers to raise the actual price as demand
increased without overtly appearing to do so. This would forestall charges of inflationary cost
increases. Id. at 159-60.
86 Id at 193.
87 However, it is to be noted that the chronic oversupply of the sulphur industry ended in 1963
due to an increase in the rate of consumption and a decrease in the rate of increase of supply. Id
at 177.
88 Larson gives some indication of the relative importance of industry concentration and prod-
uct homogeneity on the successful operation of a horizontal combination as a joint marketing
entity. Larson, An Economic Analysis of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 13 J. L. & ECON. 461, 479-80
(1970). Larson's data sample consisted of the 47 Webb-Pomerene associations extant from 1958-
1962. Association success as a joint marketing association was considered as a function of indus-
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The second theory advanced in justification of an expected adverse
effect on competition in American interstate or foreign commerce holds
that the cooperation could erect a barrier to foreign market entry
against American exporters not parties to the combination. Barriers to
market entry can be raised at two levels.89 First, a horizontal export
group might refuse to sell its products to independent exporters. This is
normally a restraint on intrabrand competition. If a number of pro-
ducers export directly to foreign markets, they clearly have a substan-
tial competitive advantage over an independent exporter that buys
from them domestically and then exports, since the exporter must ab-
sorb his seller's mark-up. But the disadvantage of middleman mark-up
is accentuated if the independent exporters must buy from a horizontal
combination whose members do not compete inter se. If the producers
in the combination together own a significant amount of the domestic
supply, the combination can freely sell at supracompetitive prices. If
the combination has the right of self-determination, the independent
exporters will also be refused membership in the combination and will
continue to buy from the combination at a supracompetitive price.
A second level of entry barrier exists when the strength of a hori-
zontal combination prevents the entry of a domestic producer into a
foreign market. This is the interbrand restriction involved in State of
Kuwait. In order for a horizontal marketing entity to work effectively,
try concentration and product homogeneity. By means of a regression analysis, a regression equa-
tion and multiple correlation coefficients were developed which suggested a high, positive
correlation between an industry which is concentrated and deals in a homogeneous product and
an industry which can successfully support a Webb-Pomerene association. Id
Larson reports that the concentration variable explains three times as much of the variance as
does homogeneity. Id If the success of a joint marketing association is principally dependent on
industry concentration, incidents ofjoint marketing (e.g., spillover) might also be reasonably be-
lieved to be responsive primarily to industry concentration. Thus, the case study of the sulphur
industry may well be generalizable well beyond its severe specific facts.
89 The law that has evolved around the Webb-Pomerene Act gives some guidance concerning
which practices raise impermissible barriers to entry. For example, the members of a Webb-
Pomerene association may not be found to restrict resale to nonexporters, United States v. Alkali
Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), nor may the association set terms of sale by
members to independent exporters, Pacific Coast Industries Ass'n, TNEC, Monograph 6 at 130.
Associations may not sell on behalf of nonmembers, Phosphate Export Ass'n, 42 F.T.C. 555
(1946), and no association may restrict the sale of a nonmember, Sulphur Export Corp., 43 F.T.C.
820 (1947); Florida Hard Rock Phosphate Export Ass'n, 40 F.T.C. 843 (1945).
However, certain practices ancillary to exporting through a Webb-Pomerene association ap-
pear to be permitted. For example, an association may sell at higher prices to a nonmember
exporter than to a foreign distributor, and it may have exclusive foreign distributors which are
obliged to resell above a certain price. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F.
Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950). Also, the association may contractually bind the members to treat the
association as the sole export agency for member products. Id See generally Note, Webb-Pomer-
ene v. Foreign Economic Policy, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1951) [hereinafter cited as PENN. Note].
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 1:163(1979)
it must have some control of the product supply. It seems to be tauto-
logical that a horizontal combination will restrain the export trade of
nonmembers because the amount of non-combination controlled sup-
ply is relatively small.90 This supply restraint is reinforced by business
practices such as price wars or exclusive agreements. 9'
The Webb-Pomerene Act cases have shown that barriers to entry
can generate a serious domestic effect. Thus, even though a Webb-
Pomerene association has a qualified exemption from the horizontal
application of the Sherman Act, certain barriers to entry are, neverthe-
less, forbidden. Not surprisingly, it would seem that the test of illegal-
ity developed in the Webb-Pomerene cases is whether or not the
barriers are "unreasonable." Thus, price discrimination with respect to
independent exporters will be allowed only if cost-justified. Similarly,
restraints on interbrand competition that are merit-justified should be
allowable. But if restraints are not reasonable in this limited sense,
then proof of the possibility of profitable American exports in signifi-
cant volume to the target markets makes out a violation of the Sherman
Act.92
This Webb-Pomerene experience is arguably directly applicable to
horizontal combinations where the effect of the restrictive practice pu-
tatively falls only in foreign markets. If the combination creates barri-
ers to entry which are unreasonable by the standards developed in the
Webb-Pomerene context, then presumably the injury caused by the
horizontal restrictive practice will not be strictly confined within for-
eign markets.
The Wisdom of Economic Protectionism in the Application of the
Sherman Act to American Export Trade. The ultimate question which
arises in defining the application of the Sherman Act to American ex-
port trade is whether purely foreign injuries are actionable.93 The eco-
90 Simmons, supra note 63, at 438; CHICAGO Comment, supra note 52, at 659.
91 PENN Note, supra note 89, at 1214.
92 Minnesota Mining, 92 F. Supp. at 962. See also Simmons, supra note 63, at 438. Even if
individual entry is impossible, collusive spillover might well invalidate a horizontal combination
that passes muster under the necessity test. Id at 964. The Webb-Pomerene Act simply will not
allow a restraint to fall upon domestic exporters. As one court noted, "[w]hatever degree of com-
bination the Webb Act may exempt from the antitrust laws, it does not sanction the use of monop-
oly power to extinguish the competition of independent domestic competitors engaged in the
export trade." United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 76 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
93 Compare Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8 COR-
NELL INT'L. L.J. 16 (1974) with Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Cov-
ered?, 8 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 1 (1974) and Rahl, A Rejoinder, id at 42.
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nomic protectionists answer in the negative; Todhunter-Mtchel: 4
answers in the affirmative. Analysis must resolve whether the Sherman
Act ought to be or needs to be protectionist.
This question is best explored in the context of the Webb-Pomer-
ene associations, where there is relevant and instructive experience for
the analyst to examine. In enacting the Webb-Pomerene Act, Congress
"thought it could increase American exports by depriving foreigners of
the benefits of competition among American firms, without in any sig-
nificant way injuring American consumers." 95 What, then, has been
the result of such blatant chauvinism?96
Under the Webb-Pomerene Act, American antitrust policy became
Janus-faced. This inconsistency in policy between the domestic appli-
cation of the Sherman Act and the exemption granted under the Webb-
Pomerene Act was not lost on the Supreme Court in a Sherman Act
case decided less than two years after the Webb-Pomerene Act's pas-
sage: "We do not see how the Steel Corporation can be such a benefi-
cial instrumentality in the trade of the world, and its beneficence be
preserved, and yet be such an evil instrumentality in the trade of the
United States that it must be destroyed. '97
The inconsistency has also not been lost on foreign countries who
use the existence of the Webb-Pomerene Associations as a justification
for their own export cartels.98
As a result, international trade has been amazingly exempt from
94 375 F. Supp. 610,findingspartially amended, 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
95 United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n., 393 U.S. 199, 208 (1968).
96 A sampling of the legislative history gives the flavor of the times. Representative Carlin
was explicit in his chauvinism: "I am frank to say that personally, I have no sympathy with what
a foreigner pays for our products; I would like to see the American manufacturers get the largest
price possible . H..." earings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary on HA. 16707, 64th
Cong., Ist Sess., 7 (1916).
The Act's sponsors were equally blunt. Senator Pomerene said, "[w]e have not reached that
high plane of business morals which will permit us to extend the same privileges to the peoples of
the earth outside of the United States that we extend to those within the United States." 55 CONG.
REC. 2787 (1917). Representative Webb expressed similar views: "I would be willing that there
should be a combination between anybody or anything for the purpose of capturing the trade of
the world, if they do not punish the people of the United States in doing it." 55 CONG. REC. 3580
(1917).
97 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 453 (1920).
98 Cf. 1967InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 124 (statement of Donald Turner,
Assistant Att'y. Gen.). For examples and authorities which show specific reliance on the Webb-
Pomerene exemption by other countries to justify forming export cartels, see N.Y.U. Note, supra
note 64, at 346 n.31. Germany explicitly relied on Webb-Pomerene in exempting export cartels.
1974 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 48-49, 757. Japan's exemption of export
cartels in 1952 was also aided by the existence of Webb-Pomerene. Ariga & Rieke, TheAntimono-
pol, Law of Japan and Its Enforcement, 39 WASH. L. REv. 437, 473 (1964).
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the spreading competitive norm in intranation trading throughout the
world. 99 Nevertheless, as a matter of international comity, it ill-
becomes the United States that its Magna Carta of economic freedom
applies differentially as a function of who is injured10° Furthermore,
this hypocrisy is likely to foster foreign retaliation.
Foreign retaliation against an export cartel can take two forms.
The target country may legislate against it or form a countervailing
buying cartel to neutralize it. Under objective territoriality, foreign
countries would be justified, under international law, in legislating
against conduct sanctioned in America which violates their national
laws. '0' This two-way street of extraterritorial antitrust has been recog-
99 Antitrust has become firmly established in the legal systems of most of the major trading
nations of the free world, as recognized in Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Pfizer, Inc. v. India,
434 U.S. 308, 327 (1978). The burst of antitrust legislation in the major trading countries of the
West and Japan after World War II reflected two major realizations. First, those historically
opposed to antitrust, mainly the Germans and the Japanese, were in no position to block antitrust
laws. Second, for various reasons, the major trading countries believed that control of cartels
would be desirable. Since the war had done much to seriously weaken international and national
cartels, the time for antitrust legislation was opportune. C. EDWARDS, CONTROL OF CARTELS AND
MONOPOLIES: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 8-13 (1967). For a superb study of the German
experience in comparative perspective with the United States, see 1974 International Antitrust
Hearings, supra note 7, at 53-74 (statement of Dr. Mestmacker).
For an in-depth and comprehensive comparative study of the antitrust law of the major trad-
ing nations, see Hearings on Antitrust Development and Regulations of Foreign Countries Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2 (1965).
100 See Chapman, Foreign Commerce Section, Department of Justice in Symposium.- The Inter-
national Practice of Law, 7 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 212 (1972).
The regulation of international competition has been done historically with instruments that
are crude and blunt, devoid of the elaborate procedural and substantive rules that have
evolved in domestic law. As business is progressively internationalized, this legal schizophre-
nia obviously cannot continue. The battles now being joined in the Tariff Commission, the
Treasury Department and other agencies appear to be only the early developments in the
evolution of a legal regime for the regulation of competition in international trade more con-
sistent with that which governs our domestic commerce.
Id at 214. See also 1967 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 128 (statement of Don-
ald Turner); Shenefield Interview, supra note 22, at AA-2 to AA-3. Ass't Attorney General
Shenefield favors repeal of the Webb-Pomerene Act on the grounds that it is not necessary. Mr.
Shenefield characterizes as "completely wrong" the argument that the "antitrust laws needlessly
prevent a lot of export activity, that the antitrust laws impose tremendous cost, and that they
impede things the businessmen ought to be able to do." Id at AA-3.
For a superb analysis of the political costs which more permissive American legislation would
cause in UNCTAD and OECD, see 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 788-91,
795-97 (statement of Prof. Robert Smith). For a dramatically opposed view (Le., American anti-
trust laws should be suspended until Japan and the EEC nations adopt comparable laws to re-
strain their exporters), see Final Report of United States Chamber of Commerce Task Force on
U.S. Antitrust Laws and American Exports, reprinted in 1974 International Antitrust Hearings,
supra note 7, at 163.
101 See Ongman, supra note 25. See also Thiesing, Antitrust and International Law as Viewed
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nized since the very beginning of important foreign antitrust laws.
10 2
The scope of foreign and especially EEC antitrust laws is ever-
expanding.'0 3 To the extent that foreign antitrust laws grow stronger,
any American exception for export combinations would tend to be-
come futile since the combination would be "escaping" American anti-
trust law only at the price of being "caught" by foreign law.' 04
Countervailing combinations have been formed to neutralize mo-
nopoly with monopsony. The most notorious examples are in the
sulphur industry with the formation of a buying pool by the British. 105
Sulphur buying cartels have also surfaced in Australia and New Zea-
land. 0 6 Although the American selling cartel claims it did not foster
the buying cartels, 0 7 economic evidence seems to justify the monopso-
nies as a necessary defense to economic chauvinism.' 0 8 Thus, the pin-
from the United States and European Common Market, 25 RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF N.Y. 208, 209 (1970).
102 See, e.g., Timberg, Conflict and Growth in the International and Comparative Law of
Antitrust, 4 ABA SECTION INT'L & COMP. L. BULL. 20, 24-25 (1960).
103 See Dyestuffs case, I COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) T 2542.39 (1973). Europeans have no sym-
pathy for other countries' restrictive exporting policies they would not tolerate at home. Thiesing,
supra note 101, at 209.
For a description of liberalization of extraterritorial application of European and EEC anti-
trust laws, see 1974 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 645-46, 670-72. See also
Note, Article 85 and European Antitrust Litigation: A Search for Economic Balancing, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1275 (1975).
104 It is interesting to note that a former Attorney General has used the spreading competitive
norm as the basis of an argument that American law should apply less frequently:
[Prior to WWII, the absence] of comprehensive antitrust regulation in Western Europe may
be one of the reasons that U.S. enforcement agencies were anxious to expand the jurisdiction
of the antitrust laws extraterritorially. But now that this antitrust vacuum has been filled in
Western Europe, there may not be a pressing need to have our antitrust laws expanded to
cover activities there.
Speech by former Attorney General Herbert Brownell to the National Industrial Conference
Board (May 16, 1962), quoted in 1964 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 232.
Yet, P. Ver Loren van Themant, a former Director of Competition Policy for the EEC, has
testified recently that European antitrust law is snagging American business much more than the
extraterritorial application of American law: "[There] are cases in which there has been, on the
European side, a control of restrictive practices to which American firms participated, and which
had not been forbidden by the American authorities." 1974 International,4ntitrust Hearings, supra
note 7, at 796.
105 The creation of the buying group required an exemption from the British antimonopoly
statutes. This was provided, according to the British statutory scheme, by the Restrictive Practices
Court which felt the market conditions justified the creation of a buying cartel. In re National
Sulphuric Acid Ass'ns Agreement (No. 2), L.R. 6, R.P. 210 (Rest. Prac. 1966).
For Sulexco's argument that it did not cause the import cartel and that the British buying
group engaged in unfair trade practices against Sulexco, see 1967InternationalAntitrust Hearings,
supra note 7, at 277-79 (letter from Sulphur Export Corp. to Sen. Hart, July 27, 1967).
106 See N.Y.U. Note, supra note 64, at 370 n.163 (1969).
107 Id See also letter from Sulphur Export Corp., supra note 105.
108 In the 1963-1964 export year, Sulexco, the Webb-Pomerene association, refused to export
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ciple of countervailing power generates a bilateral monopoly. 10 9
Various economic theories further indicate that protectionism, es-
poused by the framers of the Webb-Pomerene Act, does not make eco-
nomic sense.
Some commentators have suggested that higher prices in foreign
markets mean higher profits for American firms. This view was shared
by the framers of the Webb-Pomerene Act."l0 Additional present-day
support is provided by arguments for improving the balance of pay-
ments."'1 However, such a stance "indicates by and large an ignorance
of any profound knowledge of the theory of international trade and
although the major producers were operating at only 60% capacity. Sulexco felt overseas prices
were too low. Since Sulexco's market covered 50% of the world market, the overseas effect was
similar to that of the OPEC oil embargo. In 1964, the price to U.S. buyers remained constant
while the world price doubled. The British buying cartel was formed in order to cope with this
problem. The buying power of the cartel enabled it to purchase all of its requirements from
sources of supply other than Sulexco. Larson Thesis, supra note 39, at 177-80.
109 See generally J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING
POWER 108-34 (rev. ed. 1956). See also 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 691-
92; 1974 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 69-70.
Another example of countervailing power is found in the industrialized nations' response to
OPEC. The newly formed International Energy Agency is putting pressure on OPEC by building
up emergency stockpiles, enforcing conservation, and encouraging substantial investment in alter-
native energy sources. See Kraar, OPEC is Starting to Feel the Pressure, FORTUNE, May 1975, at
285-86. For a generalized discussion of the defensive cartel, see H. KRONSTEIN, THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 142-53 (1973) [hereinafter cited as KRONSTEIN]. Cf. The Impact of
Buyer Concentration in Manufacturing Industries, 57 REv. ECON. & STAT. 125 (1975).
110 K. Parzych, An Analysis of Export Trade under the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 60-83
(1970) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation in economics at the University of Connecticut); Weiner &
Parzych, The Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act: 4 U.S. Antitrust Exemption, 6 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 119 (1972).
111 In recent years the U.S. balance of payments has been in deficit. See SENATE FINANCE
COMM., 93RD CONG., 2D SEsS., U.S. BALANCE OF TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (Comm.
Print 1974). A deficit, of course, has the undesirable effect of making the United States an interna-
tional debtor. See generally Mullen, Export Promotion: Legal and Structural Limitations on a
Broad United States Commitment, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 57 (1975). It is unclear, however,
that restrictive practices in export trade have more than a marginal effect on the balance of pay-
ments. For example, American merchandise trade shifted from a $3.9 billion deficit for the first 3
quarters of 1971 to a $7.2 billion surplus for the first 3 quarters of 1975. The decrease in U.S.
demand for foreign products derived from recession, liquidation of domestic inventories and the
favorable cumulative effects on the U.S. competitive position of depreciation of the dollar relative
to a number of leading foreign currencies. U.S. COMMERCE DEPT., BALANCE OF TRADE DEVEL-
OPMENTS: THIRD QUARTER 1975, 55 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 14 (Dec. 1975). See also
Hein, United States Foreign Trade: From Deficit to Surplus-and Back?, WORLD Bus. PERSPEC-
TIVES, No. 20 (April 1974). During this time, American substantive antitrust policy in the export
field remained unchanged.
The 1975 statistics show a remarkable recovery. Export of goods went from a $5.3 billion
deficit in 1974 to a $9 billion surplus in 1975. This is the largest surplus since a $10 billion surplus
during the Marshall Plan in 1947. In addition, the basic balance which accounts for purchases
and sales of goods as well as transactions in services such as military aid and investment dividends
was in surplus by $1.4 billion as contrasted with a $10.7 billion deficit in 1974. The basic balance
Antitrust and Export Trade
1:163(1979)
competitive markets.""112
Generally, economic theory suggests that exports may be ex-
panded in three ways.1 3 First, goods may be brought to non-domestic
markets where their price in such markets is relatively low. Proponents
of such expansion advocate their position by means of international
trade theory. 14 Second, exports might increase as trade barriers are
reduced.115 Third, reducing the cost of exporting will increase export
trade. 16 Within this framework, some judgments are possible about
the economic desirability of protectionism.
Two theories explaining the operation of international trade are
widely held by economists: the principle of comparative costs and fac-
tor proportions analysis."i7 Each of these theories, even in its most ele-
surplus was the first recorded since the measure was created in 1960. U.S. Records First Trade
Surplus in 1975, Chi. Tribune, Mar. 25, 1976, § 4, at 11, ol. 3.
112 Fournier, The Purposes andResults of the Webb-Pomerene Law, 22 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 19
(1932).
113 R. Curry, Jr., An Economic Analysis of the Gains from Trade Effects of Webb-Pomerene
Export Trade Associations 57-58 (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in economics submitted
at the University of Oregon) [hereinafter cited as Curry Thesis].
114 Id
115 This paper shows that bargaining disadvantages are rarely substantial. In addition, tangible
negotiation advantages in reducing trade barriers by collective bargaining are scarce as can be
seen from the Webb-Pomerene experience.
This is partly because the American Government frequently assumes the role of negoti-
ating agent in freeing opportunities for U.S. exporters. It is apparently due, moreover, to the
fact that membership coverage in fragmented industries is rarely sufficient to gain tangible
bargaining advantage for member versus nonmember exports. In fact, associations play a
significant role as bargaining agents for U.S. products only where domestic producers are
few, membership coverage is high, and the U.S. position in world trade is large.
1967 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 45 (statement of Willard Mueller, Director,
Bureau of Economics, FTCS).
116 Curry Thesis, supra note 113, at 57-58. See also Wolfe, Transport Costs and Comparative
Advantage, 67 J. POL. EcoN. 392 (1959).
117 Much of the following economic discussion relies on the coherent outline of the various
theories of international trade compiled in H. HELLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY AND
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HELLER]. Heller directs the reader to the
classical literature, much of which has received sustained criticism.
It has been noted that international trade theory has not been integrated with theories of
imperfect competition in domestic markets. Professor Harry G. Johnson points out that '...
pure international trade theorists have been preoccupied with two major theoretical
problems, for the study of which it has been necessary to assume perfect competition;...
[first], to define the precise sense in which it can be maintained that free trade is a welfare-
maximizing policy;... and [second], to work out and refine the so-called Heckscher-Ohlin
model of international trade, whose power and elegance depend entirely on its assumption of
perfect competition .... Fascination with these formal theoretical problems has dominated
the literature, to the exclusion of empirically derived problems. .. .'
Curry Thesis, supra note 113, at 263 n.72 (quoting Johnson, International Trade and Monopolistic
Competition, in MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION THEORY: STUDIES IN IMPACT 205 (R. Kuenne ed.
1967)).
Nevertheless, though demonstrations of market performance cannot be predicted by interna-
tional trade theory, presumptions "as to benefit or injury from particular disturbances [effects] in
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mentary form, says something negative about the economic utility of
horizontal restrictive combinations in export trade.
The principle of comparative costs states that a country will tend
to export, out of a set of commodities, the commodity whose relative
cost or comparative cost of production is lower than it is in the poten-
tial import country.118 The short-term maximization of profits in ex-
port trade can, therefore, be counterproductive in the long term. As
noted above, an assumption of elastic commodity demand implies that
as prices increase the number of units of domestically produced com-
modity will decrease, depressing the domestic economy.' 19 In time, the
price will rise to the level where the cost of production in the United
States and in an export-target nation will be equal. As the comparative
cost differential grows smaller, export trade will markedly decrease. If
the comparative cost differential turns negative, export trade will
halt. 120 Thus, inflated product prices deriving from price fixing in a
horizontal combination may tend towards the elimination of American
export in the product.
The second theory, factor proportions analysis, 121 assumes that
countries are characterized by different factor endowments and that
there are different factor intensities between products. The theory
also assumes identical production functions for all countries.122 Given
these assumptions, factor proportions analysis concludes that a country
foreign trade" may still be garnered. J. VINER, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 527 (1937). At the level of judicial intervention, only such general presumptions will be
within the scope of proper inquiry.
118 HELLER, supra note 117, at 29-49.
119 That is, the profit maximizing price may not be the total revenue maximizing price. 1972
InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 247 (statement of Sen. Hart). Increased produc-
tion is only a stop-gap measure. As a result of a horizontal combination's foreign success, target
countries will seek self-sufficiency and local investment will be attracted by the anticompetitive
profits. When this new production, either in purchaser or exporter countries, is introduced, prices
will equilibrate to a normal competitive level leaving the industry with severe overcapacity. See
N.Y.U. Note, supra note 98, at 373-74; 1967 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 214
(statement of Donald Turner); 1972 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 685, 693.
120 The available empirical evidence shows a continuous trade decrease as the comparative
differential grows small. However, trade does not stop when the differential reaches zero, and the
quantum of trade may continue undiminished even when the differential is non-negligibly nega-
tive. There are two main causes for this development. First, products may be differentiated
within commodity classes. In such cases, brand preference and product price inelasticity arise.
Second, oligopolistic firms price products differently than those in competitive markets. These
special pricing techniques often allow oligopolists to maintain markets at a supra-competitive
price. HELLER, supra note 117, at 47-48.
121 This theory, also called the Heckscher-Ohlin model, was originally presented in 1919 by Eli
Heckscher and elaborated upon in 1933 by Bertil Ohlin. Id at 64 n.3.
122 Factors of production may be defined as those productive resources which can be used to
produce commodities desired by a country's populace. Certain products will require a greater
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will tend to export commodities which are intensive in its abundant
factors, relative to other countries.1 23 The United States is the most
capital-abundant country in the world and factor proportions analysis
would predict that "the United States will tend to export commodities
that are intensive in her abundant factor, namely, capital, while im-
porting commodities that could be produced at home only by the inten-
sive utilization of her scarce factor of production, labor."' 124
Indeed, American export trade is principally in capital-intensive,
high-technology goods.' 25 Most of these goods are highly differentiated
products which are purchased for a narrow, specific purpose.
However, the available evidence with Webb-Pomerene associa-
tions shows that those products in which it would be theoretically most
beneficial for the United States to trade are also the products which
manufacturers do not desire to market through horizontal combina-
amount of one factor than another. These certain products are termed "relatively intense" in this
one factor. Production functions describe the methodology of commodity production.
123 Stated somewhat less technically, each nation specializes in producing commodities which
its physical conditions of production and raw materials favor. Trade occurs when these commodi-
ties are exchanged for other commodities which the country cannot favorably produce. Lancaster,
The Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Model A Geometric Treatment, 24 ECONOMICS 19, 28-39 (1957).
124 HELLER, supra note 117, at 69. See generally id at 64-71. See also Curry Thesis supra note
113, at 52-62. Some of Curry's arguments appear piecemeal in four locations. See Curry, The
Webb-Pomerene Law: A Continuing Controversy, 27 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 1; Curry, Economic
Characteristics of Members of Webb-Pomerene Export Associations, OREGON Bus. REV., July
1967, at 1; Curry, Economic Activities of Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Associations, 26 OREGON
Bus. REV., Aug. 1967, at 1; 1967 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 4 (statement of
Robert L. Curry, Jr.).
It appears that labor is no longer as "scarce" a factor of production as it once was. The
average annual percentage gains in unit labor costs-changes in the labor compensation involved
in the production of one unit of output-has been relatively low for the United States over the
period 1960-1973. Indeed, the percentage rise in this period was only one-half that of Japan.
Bauer, The Competitiveness of U.S. Exports, WORLD Bus. PERSPECTIVES, No. 22 (Aug. 1974).
125 The 1967 FTC Webb-Pomerene study noted:
The United States is still a major supplier of standardized raw materials. However, in recent
years its exports have reflected the output of a technically advanced and diversified economy.
The fruits of technical change and research and development are increasingly likely to pro-
vide the basis for any comparative advantage we may maintain in international trade.
FTC 50-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 65, at 65-66. In 1918, only 31% of American exports were
manufactured products compared to nearly 70% of American exports in 1967. Id at 68. Even
with the recent grain deals, the ratio of nonagricultural to agricultural exports was 75:22 in 1974.
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 56 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS S(23-24) (Pt. 1, Jan. 1976).
Indeed, the industries which have the best immediate export potential for the U.S. either
produce high technology products or are themselves highly technologically based. See 1973 Inter-
national Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 104 (statement of Frederick B. Dent, Sec'y of Com-
merce). For a detailed program purporting to show the feasibility of exporting low technology
goods, however, see id at 194-202. In 1971, America exported $8.4 billion more technology-inten-
sive manufactured products, $9.1 billion less nontechnology-intensive manufactured products,
and $3.3 less raw materials than it imported. In 1951-55, the respective numbers were +5.7, +1.8,
and -2.1 billion. 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 53-55.
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tions. None of the leading Webb-Pomerene-assisted products is a tech-
nically complex, differentiated product. 126 Differentiated product
marketing techniques emphasize design, performance, characteristic
brand differences, and after-sale services. These techniques are not
well-performed by a horizontal combination that necessarily de-
emphasizes product identity and pride. 127 Thus, marketing realities
prevent a horizontal combination from optimizing trade in those prod-
ucts which international trade theory indicates are the products in
which the United States may most beneficially trade.128
As we have seen, international trade theory suggests that horizon-
tal restrictive practices are counterproductive in the long term. But the
effects of restrictions in a market depend on the nature of the market.
If market imperfections are severe enough, "certain deviations from the
free-trade policy [may be] rational on purely economic grounds."' 29
Economists have pointed out that an additional restriction in an
already imperfect market will not necessarily impair the market fur-
ther. Termed the theory of second best, this view holds that "it is not
true that a situation in which more, but not all, of the optimum condi-
tions are fulfilled is necessarily, or even likely to be, superior to a situa-
tion in which fewer are fulfilled."'130 Nevertheless, it is necessary to
126 FTC 50-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 65, at 51. See also 1967 International Antitrust Hearings,
supra note 7, at 34-35 (statement of Willard Mueller, Dir. Bureau of Economics, FTC). But cf.
1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 577-78, 581 (textile machinery). A Webb-
Pomerene association of 22 textile machinery manufacturers was formed for the purpose of bid-
ding on contracts which are too large or varied for any of the members to handle individually.
The association allows the pooling of resources to the extent that it can fill the machine require-
ments of entire textile mills. Although the firms are not small, still no individual member could
supply the requirements of an entire plant. 1973 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at
312, 344-48. The association members remain very competitive domestically. fd at 348.
127 For example, a Webb-Pomerene association sponsored by the National Association of
Manufacturers organized in 1920 to export products of all types was a total failure. Note, Ten
Years' Operation of the Webb Law, 19 AM. ECON. REV. 9, 11 (1929). Consider, however, the
following statement by the National Ass'n of Manufacturers: "[In] industries where quality and
service as well as price are important, competition factors often find export associations unwork-
able." 1972 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 805.
One could conceive of a market in which price and nonprice competition coexist. Price fixing
in such a situation could be beneficial to producers, but the existence of product differentiation
ordinarily means that the market emphasizes nonprice competition. Larson Thesis, supra note 67,
at 40. Cf 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 479 (statement of Virgil V. Grant,
Exec. V.P., Caterpillar Tractor Co.).
128 See 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 793-94. Cf id at 69 (statement of
Maurice Stans, Sec'y of Commerce).
129 Haberler, Some Problems in the Pure Theory of International Trade, 60 ECON. J. 227 (1951);
Curry Thesis, supra note 113, at 62-63. See also Hale & Hale, supra note 24, at 514-15; 1974
International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 70 (statement of Prof. Mestmacker).
130 Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24(1) REV. ECON. STUD., 12 (1956-
57).
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demonstrate that a restriction of international trade is justified. Indeed,
"it is necessary to show that imperfections exist. . and that they per-
sistently operate in such a way as to weaken free trade.'131
This line of inquiry can be usefully developed by exploring two
questions. First, do there exist successful cartels exercising more eco-
nomic power than American firms against which American firms can-
not successfully compete? 32 Second, do the market distortions
supposedly caused by group practices by others in foreign markets ac-
tually weaken free trade in a way that can only be counterattacked by
an American horizontal group practice? 133
A common argument against the importance of cartels in foreign
markets is the greatly limited usage that the Webb-Pomerene Act has
received.' 34 Even the Webb-Pomerene associations are less than unan-
imous in their views on the extent and power of cartelization in world
markets.' 35 Data exist which show that cartelization is manifest in Eu-
131 See note 129 supra. Cf. Curry Thesis, supra note 113, at 184-216. Indeed, Dudley Chap-
man, Asst. Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, Dept. of Justice, after reviewing
the historical evidence on cartels, concluded: "[the foregoing examples reveal nothing inherent in
the nature of cartels that strengthens either the ability or the propensity of their members to ex-
port. Businessmen, when relieved of the rules enforcing competition, generally tend to become
not more aggressive, but less so." Chapman, Exports andAntitrust Must Competition Stop at the
Water's Edge?, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNA'L L. 399, 433 (1973). Thus, a need for any antitrust exemp-
tion in export trade must be affirmatively shown.
132 See generally C. EDWARDS, CARTELIZATION IN WESTERN EUROPE 83-89 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as EDWARDS].
Yet, since tl~e Edwards study, no further investigation has occurred. Senator Inouye ex-
pressed the resulting concern directly:
With all of the people in government, it appears that we have very little, if any, informa-
tion about the current activities of our competitors as far as foreign export cartels are con-
cerned. In view of this lack of information, what is the basis for the oft repeated claim that
antitrust laws inhibit American firms from competing effectively abroad?
1973 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 392.
In the absence of such empirical data, our study will explore Senator Inouye's question on the
basis of a theoretical analysis.
133 Cf. Hale & Hale, supra note 24, at 517, 523. The evidence presented below as to the effect
of cartelization in world markets must necessarily be only suggestive. So many forces affect inter-
national commerce that it is doubtful whether conclusive evidence of the quantitative effect of
permitting combinations among exporters will ever appear. Id at 517 n.82.
134 Dr. Mueller, Director, Bureau of Economics, FTC, has estimated that only 2.4% of Ameri-
can exports are sold by Webb-Pomerene associations. 19671nternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra
note 7, at 58. If goods independently exported by firms belonging to Webb-Pomerene associations
are included, the figure doubles. Id at 181 (statement of Lawrence McQuade, Acting Ass't Sec. of
Commerce).
In 1967, only $600 million were actually exported by WPA's. Of this amount, about $120
million was sold to the federal government and $300 million was accounted for by the motion
picture industry. Id at 184. The 1973 Antitrust Hearings indicate that the percentage of Webb
exports dropped to between I and 2%. 1973 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 311.
135 In a 1969 survey, the question was asked whether cartels are still effective in each industry
of the responding association and member firm; 73% of the associations and 64% of the firms
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ropean areas to which Webb-Pomerene Associations export. 136 How-
ever, data on the types and degrees of persistent market restrictions
which export trade associations meet are not available.
137
An exhaustive 1967 study documented ninety-seven international
cartels which existed some time between 1940 and 1967.138 Of the car-
tels still suspected to be in operation, only a handful were dealing in the
capital-intensive, high-technology, differentiated product which ac-
counts for most of U.S. export trade.139 Indeed, the great foreign com-
mercial triumphs of recent years have been individual corporations
exploiting the uniqueness of their differentiated products and ser-
vices. 140
thought effective cartels still existed in their industry. Wesolowski, An Inquiry Into the Administra-
lion and Utilization of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 4 INT'L LAW. 107, 117-18 (1969).
However, the evidence adduced at congressional hearings suggests that group bargaining
units were useful in bargaining only for the sulphur and motion picture export associations. 1967
International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 35, 37-38, 54. Yet even the restrictions that the
sulphur and motion picture export associations met may have arisen as a defensive "counter-
vailing power" on the buyer's side of the market induced by strong American market power in the
products. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 98, at 370 n.163; Curry Thesis, supra note 113, at 136-42, 157,
207-14.
Moreover, Curry's research showed that no association or firm officials indicated that "con-
certed association restrictions were required to cope with organized foreign competitors, as distin-
guished from organized customers." Id at 214. In addition, foreign cartels have had a negligible
effect on WPA disbanding. FTC 50-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 65, Table 11-3, at 27.
136 Curry Thesis, supra note 113, at 119-35; EDWARDS, supra note 132, at 10-11, reprinted in
1964 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 493-94. Edwards' research has disclosed a
long list of restrictions including: fixed selling prices; recommended selling prices; buying prices:
fixed resale prices; recommended resale prices; discounts and rebates of volume and other vari-
eties; other terms of sale; control of production; quotas; allocation of territories, customers, and
types of goods; joint use of trademarks with commercial restrictions; refusals to deal; maintenance
of a list of recognized traders; discrimination in the denial of customary terms to certain groups;
and eligibility for discounts or terms based on trading functions. Id
137 Curry noted the reasons for the paucity of this data in his 1967 dissertation: "[t]he associa-
tions and member firms did not supply sufficient information through answered questionnaires
and interviews to support a fuller discussion of these problems. Neither the Federal Trade Com-
mission nor any other government agency collects such data." Curry Thesis, supra note 113, at
122 n.17.
138 L. Seraphin, International Cartels and the Impact of American Antitrust Law 12-28 (1968)
(unpublished manuscript on file in the Library of the Northwestern University School of Law).
139 Technology-buying cartels seem to spring up only in the communist bloc and in less devel-
oped countries. 1972 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 578.
International technology cartels are to be distinguished from export cartels which export tech-
nology. Export cartels are prevalent in such areas as machine tools, electronics, automotive goods,
consumer products, motion pictures, and the consulting (engineering and construction) industry.
1973 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 362.
140 A partial list would include Volkswagen, Sony, Toyota, Volvo, Norelco, and Christian
Dior. 1974 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 175 (Kauper Memorandum). Indeed,
Dr. Werner Benisch of the Federal Association of German Industries felt that export cartels per-
mit neither Germany nor America to export more goods: "[i]f we include [in the definition of
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Further, whipsawing will also tend to disappear if American firms
dominate their foreign counterparts in relative size. If American firms
generally tend to dwarf foreign competitors, then foreign cartels could
not afford to ignore a particular U.S. firm's correspondingly large pro-
portion of the world supply in a specific product. 141 Indeed, American
firms tend to be much larger than their foreign rivals. United States
companies were, in 1966, on the average, five times larger than British
or German companies and ten times larger than French companies. 42
Of the world's 50 largest companies, 24 are American. But more im-
portantly, American companies account for 57% of the total sales, 53%
of the assets, 52% of the employees, and 68% of the net income of the
top 50 corporations. 43 Indeed, a major study has found that one of the
reasons why European and Japanese governments allow export cartel-
ization is to compete effectively with powerful American-based mul-
tinational companies. 44
Yet let us assume that price fixing and sales quota cartels still exist
in world markets in significant numbers. 45 An examination of the
export cartels] agreements on prices and market research and the like, then I would not foresee a
great increase of productivity as a result of the existence of such export cartels." 1974International
Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 1006.
141 Larson Thesis, supra note 67, at 99-107. For detailed information on economic concentra-
tion outside of the United States, see Hearings on Economic Concentration Outside of the United
States Pursuant to S. Res. 233 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 7 (1968).
Dr. Mueller, Dir., Bureau of Economics, FTC, has noted that the "great bulk" of American
companies can take care of themselves in the foreign markets. 1967 InternationalAntitrust Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 48.
142 Larson Thesis, supra note 67, at 100. A trend towards increased European concentration
has been met by legislation in the Common Market. 1974 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra
note 7, at 8, 13, 16.
As a rule, American firms are the largest in their respective field of activity. Id at 647. For a
listing of the largest American dominated companies in Germany, see id at 697-99. It is interest-
ing to note that of the 50 largest firms headquartered in Germany, 7 are American subsidiaries.
Id at 1021.
143 The Ffly Largest Industrial Companies in the World, FORTUNE, Aug. 1975, at 163 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Ffty Companies]. In addition, of the 300 largest Western corporations in 1972, 170
were American, 20 were German, and 58 were from the rest of the EEC. Of the 25 largest, 17
were American, 2 German, and 5 belonged to the rest of the EEC. 1974 International Antitrust
Hearings, supra note 7, at 1020.
144 U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, 93RD CONG., IST SESS., IMPLICATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL
FIRMS FOR WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT AND FOR U.S. TRADE AND LABOR 866 (Comm.
Print 1973). See also 1967 International.4ntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 18; 1974 International
Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 28. Cf. id at 1085.
145 Kronstein concluded that: "between the two world wars the international agreements were
open, whereas today there are hidden international market divisions based primarily on quota
allocations." KRONSTEIN, supra note 109, at 129. Thus a discussion of the economics of beating a
cartel is of more than academic interest even in the face of a paucity of evidence pointing to the
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sources of a cartel's economic power makes one wonder why substan-
tial American firms cannot beat foreign cartels.
Cartels operate by fixing prices, allocating territories and setting
quotas.' 46 The price levels in the various geographic markets become
supracompetitive due to the fact that the cartel's product is distributed
by a nonmarket-conscious allocation scheme. In addition, supracom-
petitive revenues depend on inelastic product demand. 47
However, if the cartel has only a relatively small coverage of the
product market, large buyers would be free to buy from American ex-
porters who either beat the cartel price directly or sell in areas where
the cartel has set a quota. Cartel theory, therefore, predicts that firms
operating outside a cartel-including American firms-actually benefit
from the supracompetitive price set by the cartel members. 48
existence of profit-maximizing cartels. Accord 1964 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7,
at 19 (statement of Dr. Corwin Edwards).
Of course, isolated instances of price cartels do exist. For example, the quinine and quinidine
cartel have been heavily documented. See Hearings on Prices of Quinine and Quinidine Be/ore the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly ofthe Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
2 (1967).
146 This discussion of cartel theory is patterned largely after Larson. Larson Thesis, supra note
67, at 117, 200. The most useful definition of the modem cartel is provided by Kronstein:
"[t]herefore, the first characteristic of the modem cartel is the consent of the parties to isolate a
special market from normal market discipline and to submit it to an artificial order. Secondly, this
consent of the parties must induce parallel or complementary economic behavior that influences
or regulates the market. All other matters can be coordinated between those poles but may also be
subject to formal agreements." KRONSTEIN, supra note 109, at 40.
It should be remembered that the types of cartel restrictions most likely to injure independent
American competitors are the ones most likely to be attacked under European antitrust laws. See
1964 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 24-25 (statement of Corwin Edwards).
However, it is doubtful that European laws will act against restrictions in third country markets if
there is no effect in the EEC.
For a description of the restrictive business practice policies of the major trading nations, see
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON
RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (1971), as well as note 99 supra.
147 It is counterproductive to hold the price at supracompetitive levels if the total profits at that
price are lower than at a competitively determined price. For artificially high profits, the demand
must be inelastic. That is, if price is raised by a given percentage, the demand declines by a
smaller percentage. When this occurs, total revenue-price times demand-rises.
In addition, if demand is unstable, the cartel cannot maintain any given price and output
combination over the various demand cycles, causing individual members to lose their desire to
cooperate. See Cartelsfor Basic Raw Materials?, Bus. IN BRIEF, No. 118, Oct. 1974, at 6.
148 EDWARDS, supra note 132, at 5. Cartel theory has been confirmed by experience in at least
four industries. FTC, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL STEEL CARTELS 231-33 (1948) (steel); Larson
Thesis, supra note 39, at 133-137 (copper); 1972 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at
861-63 (fertilizer); id. at 691 (phosphorous).
Of course, the cartel could attempt to deal with the outside supply by engaging in cut-throat
competition. Interview with George DeNemesKeri-Kiss, European Economist, Economics
Group, Chase Manhattan Bank (Nov. 19, 1975). However, dumping cannot continue indefinitely,
and many nations now have antidumping codes which would tend to discourage an overt price
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Still, if the product market coverage is high, the cartel becomes the
primary source of supply. Thus, the supracompetitive price can be en-
forced by the mutual understanding that a firm buying from suppliers
outside the cartel stands the risk of the cartel's supply being shut off.
The dissenting firm, therefore, must rely on the cartel-beater to provide
him with adequate and stable supply. To the extent that such reliable
outside supply cannot be found, the cartel gains a stranglehold on the
customer. 149
But as the market coverage of a cartel increases, it also becomes
more difficult for the cartel to retain conformity among its members.150
Usually, a high coverage cartel will have a large number of members
with differently perceived self-interests. There will be large cost differ-
ences among different cartel members. And manufacturers' cartels
must deal with complicating factors of product differentiation and tech-
nological research and development.' 5 ' The result of these differences
is often secret price shadings by cartel members which are difficult for
the cartel to police. Even OPEC, the strongest cartel in history, is ex-
periencing these instabilities.' 52
Thus, even an assumed existence of effective foreign cartels cannot
fully explain the difficulty Americ~m business claims it is meeting in its
attempt to expand export markets. Perhaps Senator Adlai Stevenson is
correct when he suggests that American business must face the unpleas-
ant possibility that the reason export difficulties have been encountered
may be that certain American product lines are both high cost and no
longer at the forefront of world technology. 153
war. See generally Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the United States: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 5 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85 (1973); C. MACPHEE, RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN STEEL 166-67 (1974).
149 For a more detailed discussion of this mechanism, see C. MACPHEE, RESTRICTIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN STEEL (1974). See also Kronstein, supra note 109, at 173-75.
150 See generally Marbach, Gneralit&s sur la question des cartels at de la libre concurrence in
LES CARTELS ET LES ASSOCIATIONS PROFESSIONNELLES DE NOS JOTJRS 7 (H. Bdckli ed. 1956); E.
HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (1945); C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 274-
79 (rev. ed. 1958). For a discussion of enforcement of the cartel understanding amongst cartel
members under optimal conditions, see Kronstein, supra note 109, at 169-73; Posner, Oligopoly
and the Antitrust Laws: A SuggestedApproach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1569-75 (1969).
151 On the problem of cooperative effects in research and development, see Kronstein, supra
note 109, at 43-76.
152 See note 126 supra. But cf. Government Oilmen v. OPEC, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1976, at 34,
col. 1; 1974 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 1309.
153 See 1973 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 86 (statement of Sen. Stevenson).
See also P. PETERSON, THE UNITED STATES IN THE CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY (2 vols. 1971).
It should be noted in this regard that in the crucial area of manufactured goods, the U.S. slipped
from holding 25% of the world market in 1960 to 21% in 1970. 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 1.
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It also seems clear that horizontal combinations are unnecessary to
reduce exporting costs to competitive levels. Indeed, multinational cor-
porations and other large companies do not need joint efforts to export
economically. However, what of that group of firms-here termed
"small business"-who are either too small to support the costs of ex-
porting or whose export business is too minor to justify its cost? Are
joint efforts necessary to reduce the costs of exporting to economically
efficient levels?
For those small firms who decide they wish to export, private in-
ternational trading firms such as export management companies seem
to adequately fulfill small business' export needs. This can be seen by
examining how these companies go about meeting the needs of small
business.
Export management companies (EMC's) seem to assist small busi-
ness in these areas as well and as cheaply as horizontal joint selling
agencies. 154 Yet, EMC's do not draw to themselves undue economic
power since successful EMC's do such a good job in developing over-
seas markets for their clients that they will eventually lose the clients to
a direct market effort.' 55 In addition, EMC's carry only complemen-
Professor Rostow presents sterner criticism:
Our people are simply not working as hard as their German, Japanese or Italian competitors.
By and large, the management of our industries is failing in its responsibilities under the
circumstances. As a result, in sector after sector, we are pricing ourselves out of the market.
1972 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 883.
However, since 1972, America has been increasing exports at a much faster rate than our
eleven largest competitors, "expanding our share of the group's trade from less than 18 percent to
more than 20 percent." Fifty Companies, supra note 143, at 121. Yet the increase is mainly in the
Third World. Since 1967, the trade in manufactured goods with the industrialized countries has
been $24 billion in deficit while a surplus of $38 billion was enjoyed with the developing countries.
Id
Indeed, at variance with the commonly held theory that Japanese trade barriers are the major
reason American exports to Japan have lagged so far behind Japanese exports to America, two
reports by the American Embassy in Tokyo show that American businessmen are failing to take
advantage of a large Japanese market for certain items. 1974 International Antitrust Hearings,
supra note 7, at 1168-1299.
154 Although it may be marginally cheaper to export through a horizontal combination rather
than through an EMC, the cost differential is not large enough to raise the end-user price. 1967
InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 117-19 (statement of Frank Goodhue, V.P., First
National Bank of Chicago); 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 867 (letter from
Corwin Edwards to Sen. Magnuson); FTC 50-YEAR REview, supra note 65, at 61. For the view
that EMC's present the most viable means of expanding exports of small and middle-sized busi-
nesses and a program for implementation, see 1973 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7,
at 128-31 (statement of Donald Niewiaroski).
155 1972 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 281-82 (letter from Bruce W. Rohr-
bacher to Sen. Inouye). See also Edgerton, EMCs Help Small Firms Sell Goods on a Global Scale,
Chi. Tribune, Nov. 24, 1976, § 4, at 7, col. 2. Often what happens is the EMC builds up the export
trade of a client to about $1 million per year and then the client breaks off and starts exporting for
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tary products; directly competing products are never carried by one
EMC. 56 The 800 EMC's operating in the United States are responsi-
ble for about eight percent of American exports. 157 ,
There is a budding school of thought in the export management
community that vertical integration along the lines of the Japanese
trading companies should be allowed. The available economies of
scale from horizontal combination in manufactured goods are already
exploited by EMC's. However, the vast economies from vertical inte-
gration have not been available to American exporters. 58 -
Pure vertical integration would allow marketing, transportation,
banking, insurance, and production activities to be under the control of
one economic entity. The well-known economies incident to elimina-
tion of middlemen and duplicative services might allow the entity to
sell at a price generating normal profit levels, while below its competi-
tor's cost. Theoretically, vertical integration could radically enhance
comparative advantage in any given product.
The Japanese trading companies present a hybrid example of ver-
tical integration. t59 Six major trading companies accounted for forty
percent of Japan's total exports and up to seventy percent of the main
export items produced. In 1972, the turnover (approximately equal to
itself. Various interviews conducted by the author at the National Foreign Trade Convention,
New York, New York (Nov. 17-18, 1975) [hereinafter cited as EMC Interviews]. Indeed, the
turnover in a ten-year period of an EMC's clients is about 70%. Interview with Gilbert Weinstein,
V.P., N.Y. Chamber of Commerce, New York, New York (Nov. 19, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Weinstein Interview]. Mr. Weinstein also serves as the Executive Director of the Federation of
Export Management Companies and of the National Association of Export Management Compa-
nies.
156 This is not to say that goods from competing companies will not be carried. Company X
and Ymight both make coffee pots and air conditioners. The EMC might well sell A's coffee pots
and 3's air conditioners. EMC Interviews, supra note 155.
157 1972 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 136.
158 See A U.S. Government Policy in Support of Exports, 8-11 (Sept. 1978) (report by a Special
Task Force of the International Trade Club of Chicago on Export Expansion). There have been,
apparently, no in-depth studies of the trading company concept and its compatibility with the
American economic system. 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 282. However,
the possibility of several long range studies is now being discussed both in the private and public
sectors. Weinstein Interview, supra note 155.
159 FORTUNE, Sept. 1970 at 126; Economic Department, Secretariat, Fair Trade Commission
(Japan), Report on the Investigation of General Trading Companies, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 171
(1975); 1964 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 104 (statement of Arthur Dean). For
a departure point into the literature on the Japanese antitrust laws, see Matsushita & Hildebrand,
Antimonopoly Law of Japan-Relating to International Business Transactions, 4 CASE W. REs. J.
INT'L L. 124 (1972) and authorities cited therein. For a valuable study of the character of corpo-
rate life in Japan, see K. YOSHITAKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN
(1973). Cf W. DIEBOLD, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD: AMERICAN FOR-
EIGN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1970's 54-57 (1972).
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gross sales) of the six was 21 trillion yen (approximately 70 billion 1972
dollars) and the total value of exports handled was 3.7 trillion yen (ap-
proximately 12 billion 1972 dollars).1 60
By having marketing, transportation, banking, insurance, and pro-
duction activities coordinated under one corporate umbrella, the six
companies can take advantage of vertical economies. The economies
potentially exploitable by integrating the entire production process
from the importation of raw materials to the manufacturing and mar-
keting of finished products would seem to be obvious.
But if vertical economies are so remarkable, one wonders why
American firms are not being priced out of the market. Perhaps the
reason is that the large American multinational firms normally can
self-insure trade in manufactured goods as well as the trading compa-
nies while providing some integrative economies. 161 Perhaps the joint
marketing of products by the trading company outlet is well-suited to
the types of goods in which the Japanese primarily trade but would not
well serve the products America primarily exports. 162
160 For some examples of Japanese cost cutting through vertical integration to end user prices
below competitor's cost, see 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 855-56. See also
1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 439. For a most insightful study in English
of the operations of the six companies, see E. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN (1970).
161 EMC Interviews supra note 155, 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 836
(statement of Daniel Goldy). In addition, although Japanese export programs are more efficient
than those of the United States, most of the measures used by Japan have analogs in America.
Export financing, guarantees, and insurance coverage as practiced by Japan correspond to the
activities of the Export-Import Bank and the Foreign Credit Insurance Association. The U.S.
Department of Commerce's Office of International Trade Promotion performs export expansion
functions similar to those of the Japan Export Trade Organization. Trezise, U.S.-Japan Economic
Relations, in 1 WILLIAMS COMMISSION PAPER 183, 189 (1971).
In contrast, Germany provides its exporters little governmental assistance:
The German Government grants no export aid to German industry. The enterprises do
not even receive the classic export assistance in the form of financial support for market
surveys.
In the field of export promotion, too, the German Government declines to intervene
even though the most important foreign competitors enjoy more favorable terms of interest
through [their] Government financing instruments.
1974 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 1002 (statement of Dr. Werner Benisch).
Indeed, less than 3% of German export trade is carried on through export cartels. Timberg, Export
Agreements and Export Cartels, 1974 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 25, 31.
162 Robert Beshar, formerly the Director of the Bureau of International Commerce, Dept. of
Commerce, has noted:
Now, other than the agricultural surplus, all [the other commodities that America exports]
involve a lot of dickering with the customer. Those are custom sales for the most part. That
kind of trade is not going to be sold through joint marketing efforts. And all these easy
analogies to the Japanese who are, after all, exporting to us primarily sundries, just don't
apply. You must understand that they are coming into our market with that middle range of
consumer products and rather simple industrial equipment, which is essentially sold from a
catalogue.
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A Suggested Analysis for Horizontal Restraints. The preceding
analysis has dealt with the question of whether the antitrust laws are
injuring American export trade. The American antitrust laws that ap-
ply to horizontal restrictive business practices do not seem to affect ad-
versely American export performance. Perhaps intuitively sharing this
point of view, various Senators have exhorted the business community
to disprove this general conclusion by specific example.' 63 The re-
sponse has been meager.' 64 Indeed, there seem to be few examples
Those products are amenable to joint marketing or whatever fancy term you wish to
apply to a combined effort. Most of our exports are not in that category.
1974 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 1319.
163 Senator Hart, while the chairman of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, made
his position quite clear in a statement before Senator Inouye's Subcommittee on Foreign Com-
merce and Tourism:
Many persons have alleged for many years that the antitrust laws somehow interfere
with the exports of the United States and that these laws are so fuzzy as to present undue
uncertainty to businessmen. The Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Judiciary
Committee held extensive hearings just a few years ago on the international aspects of anti-
trust. Those hearings convinced me that the allegations were without substance and that if
anything is needed it is more vigorous enforcement of our own antitrust laws and encourage-
ment of other nations to continue their recent trends toward a more American-like policy on
restrictive business practices.
1972 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 247. See also 1964 International Antitrust
Hearings, supra note 7, at 1-16. Senator Inouye had a similar position:
Competition is the keystone of the American free enterprise system. In the absence of
convincing evidence that new legislation is needed to aid our exporters, the Congress would
understandably be reluctant to tamper with our antitrust laws. Therefore, the burden is on
the business community to present a cogent case that change is necessary and desirable.
1973 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 278.
The reasons why businesses do not feel free to give specific examples appear most vocifer-
ously in the trade press. See Sheridan, Is Antitrust Sinking the U.S. Trade Effort, reprinted in 121
CoNG. REC. 19413 (1975).
Four reasons for this silence, deriving from the Justice Department's refusal to give use im-
munity to information acquired from interviewed firms, are often given by the business commu-
nity:
1) Because of the uncertainty in antitrust, companies are never certain whether they have
committed an offense.
2) Many companies are under consent decrees and are afraid that actions they have taken
under market conditions not foreseen at the time of the decree might now be interpreted
as infringing the decree.
3) Some companies are now involved in antitrust suits.
4) Records of projects not entered into because of antitrust problems are usually not kept.
See 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 51-52; 1973 InternationalAntitrust Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 357.
164 The congressional hearings held since 1964 have developed only a handful of examples.
The 1964 International Antitrust Hearings considered a list of 20 examples presented by William
Persen, Vice President and Editor of Business International. However, the facts were so brief that
one could not make a detailed antitrust analysis. 1964 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note
7, at 52-56. Examples provided privately to the Justice Department were analyzed, and to some
extent defused, by the well-known Comegys Memorandum. 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings,
supra note 7, at 807; 1974 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 185. The Commerce
Department provided three sketchy examples. 1972 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7,
at 116; 1973 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 221. The National Association of
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where the antitrust laws are impeding the ability of American business
to compete internationally on the horizontal level.
Principally, examples of such injury exist in the service industries,
which feel they cannot combine in order to offer their service economi-
cally. 65 Although the service industries choose not to export jointly,
industry spokesmen believe that they could export under the Webb-
Pomerene umbrella; however, this position is not without dispute. 166 In
response to criticism from the service industries, bills have been pro-
posed in each of the last three Congresses to give export trade in ser-
vices the benefit of a Webb-Pomerene exemption.167
Manufacturers developed 19 case studies. 1974 International Antirust Hearings, supra note 7, at
1432-37. Recently, an ad hoc antitrust study group of the President's Export Council developed
15 case examples. These examples were provided to the author in January 1976 and served as the
groundwork for much of the thought going into this article. The examples later formed the basis
of the now famous Guide of the Justice Department. See GUIDE, supra note 30. The Justice
Guide is an important document which has become the starting point for any serious study of
antitrust in the foreign commerce area.
165 Of the examples that deal with horizontal combination in export trade, almost all deal with
consortia for the export of services. Perhaps this focus on service industries is not surprising when
one realizes that nearly 50% of the U.S. GNP is service-based and that most efforts to export goods
will find joint action inappropriate because of product differentiation, high-level technology, and
individualized services. 1973 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 208, 341.
An example in computer services is typical. A leading executive of a trade association of
computer manufacturers pointed out the emerging Latin American market. However, none of the
companies could afford entry individually. The executive concluded that: "joint operations
among two or more of these companies for the same purpose would involve antitrust implications
that automatically precluded such joint efforts." Japanese companies which could pool resources
were seen as having an unfair advantage. 1972 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7. at
375. A similar situation involving the establishment of a tele-communications system for an entire
North African country. 1973 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 314.
166 The Justice Department has noted that: "it has been doubtful whether firms could employ
an export trade association to offer construction services and the like abroad." 1973 International
Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 334-35.
Indeed, Justice blocked the registration of a Webb-Pomerene Association for construction
services. In early 1967, the staff of the FTC advised the Commission that such an association
should be permitted to register. This advice was given on the basis that blueprints, drawings, and
plans or the machinery for installation at a construction project could be categorized as "goods,
wares and merchandise" under the Act when construed in light of its legislative history. Justice,
which in 1967 advocated the Webb-Pomerene repeal in the 1967 International Antitrust Hearings,
did not wish to expand the coverage of the Act. Although the construction companies were ex-
horted to test the issue by formally registering as an association, the firms felt the risk of incurring
a lawsuit by Justice was not worth the trouble. 1973 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7,
at 389-91, 435-36.
167 S. 2754, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 37625 (1971); S. 1483, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
119 CONG. REc. 11184 (1973); S. 1774, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 14891 (1973); S. 1974,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 19400 (1975). S. 1483 would have added "data, goodwill,
insurance, technological know-how, services, facilities, or similar properties" to the Webb-Pomer-
ene Act. S. 1774 would have defined export trade as:
solely trade or commerce in goods, wares, merchandise, architectural services, engineering
Antitrust and Export Trade
1:163(1979)
However, there is a strong argument that horizontal combinations
of service companies in export trade are not violations of the Sherman
Act. Indeed, the International Economic Report of the President for
1974 found it a "well settled" antitrust principle that a joint venture,
even without Webb-Pomerene protection, will not be held illegal where
"the size and risks of commercial and industrial projects are so great
that one company cannot operate alone."' 68
This argument can best be articulated against a specific set of
facts.169 Joint bidding pools of overseas construction firms offer an im-
portant example.' 70 The National Constructors Association (NCA),
composed of American engineering-construction companies, has annu-
ally derived $3.5 billion from overseas construction of oil refineries,
petrochemical and chemical plants, and other similar facilities.' 7 ' Yet
NCA members are not allowed to engage in joint bidding; this has put
American firms at a competitive disadvantage. It has not been uncom-
mon for four or five American firms bidding independently to lose a
bid to a single consolidated Japanese or Italian entity bidding on behalf
of many firms.' 72
services, construction services, training services, financing services, or project or general man-
agement services exported, or in the course of being exported from the United States or any
territory thereof to any foreign nation: but the words 'export trade' shall not be deemed to
include (i) the production, manufacture, or selling for consumption of for resale, within the
United States or any territory thereof, of such goods, wares, merchandise, or services, or any
act in the course of such production, manufacture, or selling for consumption or resale or (ii)
trade or commerce in patents, licences, trade secrets or know-how except such know-how as is
incidental to the sale of such goods, wares, merchandise, or services.
S. 1973 makes the same exceptions from export trade as S. 1774 but offers a different defini-
tion of export trade:
exclusively trade or commerce in goods, products, merchandise, or architectural engineering,
construction, training, financing, insurance or project or general management services or the
licensing for distribution or exhibition of motion pictures or television films or tapes or simi-
lar services which are exported, or in the course of being exported, from the United States to
any foreign nation.
168 International Economic Reports of the President (1974), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 50,262.
169 For other examples of the application of antitrust principles to specific fact sets in the inter-
national antitrust area, see GUIDE, supra note 30.
170 For an ancillary example dealing with consulting engineering firms, see 1973 International
Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 120-124.
171 1973 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 110.
172 These firms are often subsidized by their governments. Even when they are not, costs-the
expenses of preparing the bid (bidding fees)--are spread over a number of individual companies
in the bidding entity. Bidding fees can be substantial: $250-$300 thousand for a $100 million
project. 1973 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 110-11. See also id. at 113-20. Of
course, these fees are lost if the contract is not let.
Subsidization operates through several mechanisms. Foreign governments give straight ex-
port subsidies, special rediscount rates, guarantees of currency convertibility, and protection
against credit and political risks. In addition, some governments provide insurance insulating the
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Yet the reason that these bids are lost may have nothing to do with
adverse effects on antitrust. Many of the overseas contracts are let on a
turnkey fixed-cost basis. That is, the plant is to be built from scratch to
the point that the owners need only "turn the key" to start productive
operation. This type of venture is a large one involving high risk, for
all this must be done at the bid price. If unexpected costs from delays
or other causes should occur, the construction consortium must bear
the loss.
The amount of commerce involved in overseas construction
projects is immense. NCA estimates its members could increase the
volume of their projects by $2 billion annually if they could engage in
joint bidding. This increased volume would spread itself throughout
the larger segment of the U.S. economy represented by the subcontrac-
tors.
The almost universal sentiment among the witnesses appearing in
Congressional hearings is that such joint bidding in the overseas con-
struction industry is feasible and desirable.173 Indeed, the Justice De-
exporter from individual price increases during the term of the project if the exporter has to give a
firm price in order to win the project. 1973 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 389,
414-15, 419.
173 At least joint bidding is not among the hard core international antitrust violations of"pred-
atory activities against American competitors, price fixing in domestic markets, and agreements
with foreign firms or cartels to limit imports into the United States." 1973 InternationalAntitrust
Hearings, supra note 7, at 243 (statement of Assistant Att'y Gen. Thomas E. Kauper).
Proposals to exempt joint bidding in overseas construction from the antitrust laws are not
rejected out of hand by the Justice Department as have been proposals for across the board ex-
emptions in export trade. These broader proposals were rejected for two basic reasons:
First, no showing has been made as to the need for allowing firms to combine for these
broader purposes so as to improve this Nation's export position; second, we have determined
that an absence of such showing of need, a broader grant of antitrust immunity may pose
intolerable risks to the consumers of this Nation by threatening domestic competition and
incentives for innovation, while at the same time impeding the competitive stance of Ameri-
can firms in international trade.
1973 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 336; 1974 International Antitrust Hearings,
supra note 7, at 172-73 (statement of Assistant Att'y Gen. Thomas E. Kauper).
The Department of State gave a strong recommendation for expanding the Webb-Pomerene
exemption to include services:
We are particularly interested in the extension of the Webb-Pomerene exemption to the
service industry. We believe that with the U.S. becoming increasingly a service economy,
there is'a good deal to be gained in our . . . trade from the export of services. When
you look at services such as contracting, architecture, design, engineering, and management,
you realize that they are somewhat fragmented in the United States.
If these services can be put together, they can compete with other countries, where such
services are not as fragmented as they are here.
Therefore, we are particularly anxious that this legislation move ahead because we be-
lieve there is a real opportunity for foreign exchange earnings and for the export of services in
this field. We think that the opportunity for these industries to operate under Webb-Pomer-
ene protection would be valuable and useful.
1973 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 338-39.
The FTC has said:
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partment cleared a Commerce Department promotion of the formation
of construction consortia on a limited basis to bid on specific major
projects totalling over $3.5 billion in South America.174
The Justice Department has outlined a few requirements needed
for a favorable Business Review letter.175 In the Comegys Memoran-
dum, two general requirements were detailed. First, participation in
the consortium must not be arbitrarily barred to firms if membership is
a practical prerequisite for competition for the project. Second, the ac-
tivities of the consortium must not have a substantial impact on the
domestic commerce of the United States. If it does, then domestic anti-
trust per se rules will apply. In a specific example dealing with overseas
construction consortia, joint bidding was said to be permissible if the
"effort does not adversely affect the competition of other American
firms," bidding singly. 176 In the Kauper Memorandum, Justice supple-
mented its position indicating that "bonafide joint bids are permissible
under the antitrust laws where there is a reasonable showing that each
party to the joint bid could not singly bid for or perform the con-
tract."' 177  A transaction will be illegal only when a consortium is
Turning now to the question of services, the Commission agrees that the Webb Act should be
amended to grant immunity for services as well as for goods. Our concern with respect to
services is that the immunity be no broader than necessary to achieve the export objectives of
the Webb Act.
1973 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 308.
The Williams Commission's only specific criticism of the Webb-Pomerene Act was that serv-
ice exports and construction consortia were precluded. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT POLICY, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTER-
DEPENDENT WORLD 120 (1971).
174 1973 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 147, 1317. This clearance goes be-
yond an earlier 1970 clearance for overseas construction projects in Southeast Asia. There the
members of the consortium were minor contractors with total domestic revenues of only $31 mil-
lion and international billings of $2.55 million. Only one member had previously done business in
Southeast Asia and that volume was negligible. 1974 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note
7, at 178-79.
Robert Besher, the former Director of the Bureau of International Commerce, Department of
Commerce, has been perplexed about "where this notion has gotten created and magnified that
there is any inhibition about going joint book on an offshore transaction." 1974 International
Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 1317. He views "Timken, National Lead and those other for-
eign commerce cases" as dealing with rigging world markets, not as relating to joint offshore bids.
Id Nevertheless, to encourage the bidding, Commerce arranged for Justice to "come and sit along
to monitor as much as they in their administrative scheme could manage, and then to advise these
people if they were going to get into a dangerous area." Id In this posture, Justice encouraged the
bidding to proceed although no formal opinion was given. Id at 1318.
175 The Business Review procedure is described at 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1978). See also 1974 Inter-
national Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 178 (statement of Assistant Att'y Gen. Thomas E.
Kauper).
176 1974 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 188.
177 Id at 173. A consortium that meets this test would not be considered an export cartel by
the Germans:
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proved to be a device for "suppressing individaul [sic] competition
which otherwise could or would have occurred, or for excluding com-
petitors."' 78 Indeed, no bidding consortium to sell to foreigners has
been attacked by Justice or by private litigants in over twenty years. ' 79
The literature in recent years has pursued the question of what
substantive rule should obtain in the international realm: a per se rule
or a rule of reason.180 Agreement exists that a reasonableness test, as a
matter of policy, might well be indicated in certain international situa-
tions where per se rules would apply domestically.18 ' For example, the
Department of Justice's Guide on Antitrust and International Operations
suggests that the rule of reason might have a broader application in the
international context because "(1) experience with adverse effects on
competition is much more limited than in the domestic market, or (2)
there are some special justifications not normally found in the domes-
If, however, the firms individually could not take the offer in its entirety-for example, if the
offer is for the setting up of a complete steel mill, and you have to have firms doing the
engineering, and firms doing the construction of buildings, and firms that supply the electron-
ics equipment--then, of course, if no single firm can supply all of this, and the bid is for the
whole project, the firms have to join together. But then, they are not really in competition
and there is no question of setting up a cartel ....
1974 InternationalAntitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 650-51 (statement of Dr. Kurt Markert).
In the EEC, a similar construction consortium has received a negative clearance because
there was no effect within the EEC from the consortium. Re the Rules of the Dutch Engineers
and Contractors Association (D.E.C.A.), 4 Comm. Mkt. L. Rept. 50 (1965).
178 1974 International Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 173.
179 Id at 173, 177. The basic question here is whether the consortium is a sham-whether the
ventures could have proceded independently. Whether the consortium is bona fide or a disguised
suppression of competition must be determined in view of all the side agreements to the principle
deal. See Remarks of Joel Davidow, Chief Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, Dep't
of Justice, August 6, 1974) (transcript of discussion between Ad hoc Antitrust Study Committee of
the President's Export Council and Representatives of Dep't of Justice and the FTC at the Com-
merce Dep't).
180 Chapman, Exports and Antitrust: Must Competition Stop at the Water's Edge?, 6 VAND. J.
TRANSAT'L L. 399, 439-45 (1973); Baker, Antitrust and World Trade- Tempest in an International
Teapot 8 CORN. INT'L L.J. 16 (1974).
Chapman proposes two options under the rule of reason. First, a company may seek a busi-
ness review letter which is given by Justice under a rule of reason analysis. See text accompany-
ing notes 175-179, supra. Second, an administrative system whereby a body of precedent with
legal effect could be developed similar to the negative clearance in the EEC is proposed. The
body of jurisprudence would derive from publishing the rationales for decisions in business re-
view-type clearance. This proposal seems only to compound the problems of the business review
letter with the spectre of further bureaucracy and greater a priori control of business by govern-
ment.
Baker would apply per se rules against restraints which operate to injure import competition
into America or act as "bully-boy" tactics injuring the export opportunities of U.S. firms. If a
restraint is directed only at a foreign market, the rule of reason would apply. Any spillover effects
would be analyzed as ancillary restraints.
181 See, e.g., Rahl, A Rejoinder, 8 CORN. INT'L L.J. 42, 43 (1974); P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS 68 (1967).
Antitrust and Export Trade
1:163(1979)
tic market." 182 The rule of reason standard generally put forth for the
international context follows domestic theory.
As a matter of law, if jurisdiction is shown and the facts make out
a restraint which falls under per se rules domestically, what is to pre-
vent a per se rule's automatic application to the international con-
duct?18 3 The only authorities dealing with this question are two cases
which contain seemingly conflicting dicta. The Justice Department
brought an action against the American manufacturers who controlled
80% of the export trade in coated abrasives. The defendant companies
established abroad jointly-owned factories and obtained membership
in a Webb-Pomerene association. Through the association the firms
attempted to increase the sales of their foreign-manufactured abrasives
by refraining from exporting coated abrasives produced in the United
States. Although the arrangement was held illegal in United States v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. (3M), Judge Wyzanski nevertheless
staunchly maintained:
It is axiomatic that if over a sufficiently long period American enterprises,
as a result of political or economic barriers, cannot export directly or indi-
rectly from the United States to a particular foreign country at a profit,
then any private action taken to secure or interfere solely with business in
that area, whatever else it may do, does not restrain foreign commerce in
that area in violation of the Sherman Act. For, the very hypothesis is that
there is not and could not be any American foreign commerce in that area
which could be restrained or monopolized. 184
However, a Supreme Court decision handed down the following
year appears to quarrel with Judge Wyzanski's axiom. The subsidiaries
of the Timken Roller Bearing Company had eliminated competition
among themselves in England, France, and the United States by means
of territorial allocation of the anti-friction bearing market. In Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected a gen-
eralized reasonableness argument:
We also reject the suggestion that the Sherman Act should not be en-
forced in this case because what appellant has done is reasonable in view
of current foreign trade conditions .... This position ignores the fact
that the provisions in the Sherman Act against restraints of foreign trade
182 GUIDE, supra note 30, at 203.
183 The difficulty of this question was noticed by Judge Leventhal in Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v.
Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 815 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1968):
With this case in a purely jurisdictional posture we need not consider the question, in many
ways more difficult, whether in terms of ruling on the merits of the validity of actions taken,
the Sherman Act standards of reasonableness developed for interstate commerce should be
applicable with full force to foreign transactions, and whether that issue is still open in light
of Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 71 S. Ct. 971, 95 L.Ed. 1199
(1951).
184 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 958 (D. Mass. 1950).
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are based on the assumption, and reflect the policy, that export and im-
port trade in commodities is both possible and desirable. Those provi-
sions of the Act are wholly inconsistent with appellant's argument that
American business must be left free to participate in international cartels,
that free foreign commerce in goods must be sacrificed in order to foster
export of American dollars for investment in foreign factories which sell
abroad. Acceptance of appellant's view would make the Sherman Act a
dead letter insofar as it prohibits contracts and conspiracies in restraint of
foreign trade. If such a drastic change is to be made in the statute, Con-
gress is the one to do it. 18 5
Timken is seen as conflicting with 3M-indeed suggesting pre-
cisely that impossibility of foreign market entry without a horizontal
combination, which would be domestically per se unlawful, does not
exempt the combination from the application of the per se rule interna-
tionally. However, the District Court in Timken explicitly found that
competition was possible and would have occurred absent the long-
standing restraint. 186 Although the profits for individual entry would
have been smaller than those resulting from entry via the horizontal
combination, still, American bearings could have been profitably ex-
ported to foreign markets without horizontal cooperation.
Thus, rather than conflicting with 3M, Timken is fully consistent
with it. Together they suggest that if, and only if, the cold legal,
financial, and governmental facts are such as to make foreign market
entry practically impossible, then a rule of reason analysis, rather than
a blind application of a domestic per se rule, will obtain.
The mean struck between 3M and Timken requires us to highlight
a workable definition of economic impossibility. The basis for this
definition is set forth in 3M itself. Judge Wyzanski averred that to
indicate economic impossibility, the evidence 187 must prove that de-
fendants could not have profitably exported from the United States a
substantial volume of their product to the foreign markets in ques-
tion. 88 Practically speaking, economic impossibility will be reached
where the long term costs of implementing the export trade will be
greater than the projected foreign profit.
185 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
186 United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 317-18 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
187 Judge Wyzanski would allow the relevant political and economic facts to be presented in-
formally.
It is sufficient if the economic and political facts come from published sources recognized as
authoritative, persuasive or reliable by the profession of economists or political scientists, and
if the publications are presented at a time and in a manner which give the adverse party
adequate opportunity to examine, to challenge, to rebut and to argue upon them.
United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. at 958.
188 Id at 959.
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Conclusion. In general, then, and assuming the above, the Sher-
man Act does not seem to forbid those horizontal combinations which
would be helpful to American export trade. Exemption of horizontal
combinations from domestic Sherman Act standards on the ground
that the injury falls only abroad would be a policy of doubtful wisdom.
The validity of the subsumed premise-that the injury falls strictly
abroad-is highly questionable.
VERTICAL RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES IN EXPORTING FROM
THE UNITED STATES
To complete the study of the effect of the Sherman Act on export
trade, the vertical arrangement of the export market must be briefly
considered. Transactions requiring the development and expansion of
export markets through foreign subsidiaries, joint ventures, or distribu-
torships often will not restrain American export competition and thus
will not make out a substantive antitrust violation.18 9 In order to more
conveniently describe those transactions which pose antitrust problems,
vertical distribution agreements may be split into several analytical cat-
egories.
First, products from countries other than the United States can be
sold and delivered abroad to foreign buyers. In a previously published
article, this regime-there termed "foreign U.S. competition"-was
shown to be outside the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act, 190 ab-
sent an unusual nexus with the United States. 19'
189 See GUIDE, supra note 30, at 5-6.
190 See Ongman, supra note 25.
191 Suppose an American firm, manufacturing and locally incorporated in Germany, obtains
requirements contracts from certain key German distributors thereby excluding a competing
American exporter from an effective presence in the German market. Since the Sherman Act
applies to transactions rather than parties, this situation should be no different from one involving
a German firm which comers the key German distributors and thereby forecloses the German
market to American exports. Cf. Rahl, International Application of United States Antitrust Laws:
Distribution Arrangements, 1974 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 17, 19-20.
When the American firm comers the market, there is a spillover onto U.S. foreign commerce
(competing U.S. exporters), but not onto domestic American consumers. Our general theory of
subject matter jurisdiction would create a presumption against jurisdiction in this case. Ongman,
supra note 25. First, the restraint occurs solely in a foreign country where the primary national
interest to be served would seem to be competition for the benefit of foreign consumers rather than
protection of American exporters. Germany is clearly the country which should attend to the
interests of product competition in Germany. Second, there is no recognized territorial basis for
jurisdiction. Since the restraint exists outside the United States, only objective territoriality could
at all be relevant as a theoretical basis of jurisdiction. But the effect of the restraint impacts on
U.S. foreign commerce; there is no immediate domestic territorial effect. Thus, the case for sus-
taining jurisdiction under an objective territoriality theory is weak.
If, however, there is a conspiracy between an American parent and its foreign subsidiary to
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Secondly, American exporters may use branches or foreign subsid-
iaries to distribute for them abroad. Intra-corporate conspiracy is not
cognizable under the Sherman Act.' 92 Thus, distribution through
branches is not within the substantive scope of the Act.
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine does permit a subsidiary
to conspire with its parent, especially when the parent and the subsidi-
ary hold themselves out to the market place as competitors. 93 How-
ever, in most cases of distribution through foreign subsidiaries, the
subsidiary will be acting merely as the parent's agent. Under these cir-
cumstances, no Sherman Act violation will exist. 194
However, if the subsidiary holds itself out as the parent's competi-
tor, or if the foreign distributor is independent of the American
exporter, then there will be no bar to a finding of intra-enterprise con-
spiracy. 9- Here the distribution arrangements would be jurisdiction-
ally covered because a foreign distribution system acquiring its
products directly from an American exporter will still be "in" Ameri-
can foreign commerce. 196
Thus, the substantive law applying to distribution practices need
only be considered as applied to independent foreign distributors ac-
quiring their products through a direct sale by an American exporter
who ships his product from America. An analysis of the principal
forms of distribution restraints is sketched below.
Export Sales to Independent Foreign Distributors
Tying. Domestically, tying arrangements are per se unlawful.197
In the Comegys Memorandum, 98 and in the Justice Department
Guide,199 tying is said to be permissible if no American exporter is ex-
cluded and only foreign firms are affected by the tie. This view-that
there is no Sherman Act violation simply because the people injured by
prevent an American competitor's exports from reaching the foreign market or if the foreign sub-
sidiary is a monopolist in the foreign market, a violation might exist. See generally Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
192 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir.
1969).
193 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951).
194 Cf Letter from Assistant Att'y Gen. Richard W. McLaren to Thomas J. O'Connell, Gen-
eral Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Feb. 22, 1971), reprinted in
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 516, DI (June 8, 1971).
195 Id
196 Ongman, supra note 25. See also Rahl, supra note 191.
197 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
198 Memorandum of the Department of Justice Concerning Antitrust and Foreign Commerce,
5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,129.
199 GUIDE, supra note 30, at 36-38.
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the tie are foreigners-would be incorrect on the basis of this article's
conclusion that the Sherman Act applies even when the injury runs
only against foreigners.200
It is, however, possible to imagine a tying-like arrangement which
would not be subject to a per se rule.20 1 Suppose Alpha, an American
company, purchases significant quantities of product X from Omega in
Western Europe. Product X is equally available in Western Europe
from at least six other companies. Alpha would like to export Y to
Western Europe, but because of delivery costs Alpha cannnot match
the price offered by the European suppliers of Y. Alpha offers to
switch its purchases of X from Omega to Delta in Western Europe if
Delta agrees to purchase its requirements of Y from Alpha. Delta so
agrees and begins buying Y from Alpha rather than from European
sources. Alpha switches its purchases of X to Delta. This arrangement
establishes the first American export presence in product Yin Western
Europe by tying sales of Y to purchases of X.
Tying-like arrangements such as these fare harshly because "com-
petition on the merits with respect to the tied product is inevitably
curbed. '202 However, since there is no American competition in export
of Y, there is no competition to curb.20 3 Indeed an export presence is
created where none existed before. Market entry without the tie is eco-
nomically impossible. Hence, our analysis of the horizontal level of the
export market above demonstrates that the restraint should be analyzed
under the rule of reason.204
Exclusive Distributorshps. Under the Sherman Act, an exclusive
foreign distributorship, without more, is permissible. 20 5 However, if
200 Indeed, in the Guide, the Justice Department acknowledged that the tying corporation was
not justified "in doing what would otherwise be illegal under U.S. antitrust laws." GUIDE, supra
note 30, at 36.
201 This example appears as Case 15 in the list of cases submitted by the ad hoc committee on
antitrust of the President's Export Council. Letter with attachments from Friedrich R. Crupe,
Executive Secretary, President's Export Council to author (Jan. 28, 1976).
202 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
203 Where American competition for export of the good or service exists, such a reciprocal
arrangement could well be illegal. Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research
and Engineering Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 70,775 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
204 See text accompanying notes 164-79 supra.
205 If the seller is dominant or if the foreign distributors covered are of crucial importance for
access to the foreign market illegality might be found. Otherwise, requirements contracts are
probably legal. Rahl, supra note 191, at 19. See, e.g., United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus-
tries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (court enjoined granting of exclusive distributor-
ships as a means of restoring competition but refused to prohibit them generally); United States v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 952, 965 (D. Mass. 1950) (Webb-Pomerene as-
sociations have an exclusive foreign distributor).
A few words should be added on the putative application of other antitrust laws to require-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 1:163(1979)
the foreign distributor is a competitor of the American exporter, sub-
stantial problems may arise.20 6
Suppose that substantial American and French manufacturers of
products in a given industry desire to establish cross-exclusive limited-
duration distributorships in the home country of the other with each
buying from the other. 20 7 The pricing by the foreign distributor will be
rationalized to fit into the price structure of the distributor's own prod-
ucts sold in its home country. The business judgment of each firm indi-
cates that this arrangement will permit more sales in the home country
of the distributor than could be enjoyed through independent export
efforts. Most of the products of the two firms are complementary but a
few are fully interchangeable in use.
This is a prima facie case of market allocation at least in the fully
interchangeable product and perhaps in the complementary products
depending on the degree of their mutual substitutability. The Sherman
Act protects competition not competitors. 20 8 Therefore, while the
quantum of commerce might well be increased by the scheme, the do-
mestic per se rule on market allocation may be applicable. An "elabo-
rate inquiry as to the precise harm [the cross-distributorships] have
caused or the business excuse for their use" is immaterial to their legal-
ity.20 9
Territorial Restrictions. A common vertical restraint is a promise
ments contracts. Section 3 of the Clayton Act is used to test such agreements domestically. How-
ever, it is inapplicable to the international sphere since by its language it applies only to goods sold
"for use, consumption or resale within the United States. . .or place under the jurisdiction of the
United States." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). Section 5 of the FTC Act would seem to be theoretically
available and thus Clayton Act or even lower standards could be applied. However, it has never
been used in this area. Rahl, supra note 191, at 19.
206 For instance, problems may develop if a U.S. company appoints a foreign company who is
a competitor in some markets as its distributor in a certain foreign country. The non-rationality of
this business scheme taints the transaction with the suspicion of market allocation between the two
companies in all of the world's markets. The same problem would arise if two U.S. companies
would have a common sales agent without foreign competition. However, if two U.S. competing
companies are in a small foreign market where there is not enough business to set up two separate
distribution systems, the legality of a shared distributor is problematical. See generally Fugate,
International Distribution 4greements, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 540, 545-46 (1974).
207 This example appears as Case 14 in the list of cases submitted by the ad hoc committee on
antitrust of the President's Export Council to the Justice Department. Letter with attachments
from Friedrich R. Crupe, Executive Secretary, President's Export Council to author (Jan. 28,
1976).
208 See, e.g., United States v. Minneosta Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 962 (D. Mass.
1950). In 3M, the court states, "[i]t is ... significant that Congress has not said you may choke
commerce here if you nourish it there." Id
209 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972), quoting Northern Pacific
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1968).
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from a buyer that it will not sell in competition with the seller in certain
markets. It is well-settled that a restraint upon resale by a foreign
buyer to the United States would be a Sherman Act violation.210 Re-
strictions on resale by a foreign distributor to a third country would,
absent unusual spillover, be outside the jurisdiction of the Sherman
Act.21' Beyond these two guideposts, some recent cases have begun to
flesh out the law.
These cases broadly deal with agreements not to export between
domestic distributors. In Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. Ltd v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc.,212 the defendant restrained its Miami and New Orleans
wholesalers from selling to the plaintiff in the Bahamas where the
plaintiff would have resold in competition with defendant's exclusive
Bahamian distributor. The agreement preventing the two wholesaler-
dealers from selling to Todhunter-Mitchell in the Bahamas was held to
be a violation of the Sherman Act.
In Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Association v. Sunkist Growers,
Inc. ,213 Sunkist and its exclusive agent in Hong Kong were held liable
for treble damages for refusing to sell citrus fruits to plaintiff, a Webb-
Pomerene association. Since Sunkist knew that plaintiff intended to
export to and sell in Hong Kong, in competition with the exclusive
agent, Sunkist directly restrained export trade of an American competi-
tor.
A recent case, Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,214 has
returned the analysis of vertical territorial restrictions to the rule of rea-
son standard.21 5 Consequently, this area of the law concerning re-
210 See, e.g., Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y: 1955) (refusal to sell
bananas produced abroad to a firm processing and then selling them in United States import trade
held illegal).
211 See Ongman, supra note 25. See also Rahl, supra note 191, at 23.
212 375 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1974), findings partially amended 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa.
1974). A similar result obtained in a consent decree based partly upon allegations that a producer
had obtained agreements from domestic distributors not to export its products. United States v.
Dymo Industries, Inc., 1967 Trade Cas. 72,102 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (consent decree).
213 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,523 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
214 Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In GTE, the Supreme
Court recognized that per se rules were in essence a balancing test to form a net judgment on the
utility of the practice when compared against the competitive norm:
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility of
particular commercial practices. The probability that anticompetitive consequences will re-
sult from a practice and the severity of those consequences must be balanced against its pro-
competitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se rule
reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the
time and expense necessary to identify them.
[d at 50 n.16.
215 Prior to GTE Sylvania, vertical territorial restrictions were held to be per se illegal in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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straint of domestic export opportunities will undoubtedly continue to
develop new principles now that the per se rule no longer applies to
vertical territorial restraints.
Resale Price Maintenance. The final area of interest in the field of
vertical restraints is resale price maintenance. Resale price arrange-
ments between Americans exporting from the United States and for-
eign distributors appear never to have been questioned. 21 6 Since the
result of resale price maintenance in the foreign market will be
supracompetitive prices, protection of American exporters would not
seem to be needed. The supracompetitive price will aid their attempts
to penetrate the market. Furthermore, the GTE Sylvania case has reaf-
firmed the prohibition against resale price maintenance.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The world of international trade is complex, esoteric, and some-
times arcane. Public barriers responding to macroeconomic principles
intermesh with restraints understandable in microeconomic terms to
form an open economy that cannot be well-described theoretically.
The increased importance of the multinational corporation in the de-
veloped countries and of producer cartels in the Third World add to
the perhaps insurmountable task of describing international trade by
classical economic theory.
In this rich fabric of international economic reality, antitrust laws
may be a relatively minor thread. Nevertheless, perhaps because of
subservience to public economic issues in world trade, the effect of anti-
trust law on international trade might not present a wholly intractable
problem. In light of today's business realities, the importance of direct
export trade may also pale before joint manufacturing ventures abroad,
the multinational corporation and the licensing of technology.
Whether these forms of doing business abroad are impeded by antitrust
law must await future study. Yet the analysis offered by this article
should be broad enough to be useful in studying each of these business
modes.
This article has limited itself to an analysis of the effects of Ameri-
can antitrust law on export trade. No one seems to doubt that when the
effect of competition on the domestic economy is direct and unques-
tioned the substantive law developed domestically should apply.
The focus of debate has been on whether the costs to American
216 Rahl, supra note 191, at 23.
216
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business of applying domestic standards to horizontal restrictive busi-
ness practices outweigh the benefits of a symmetric antitrust policy
when the injury from the restrictive practice only falls in foreign mar-
kets. Is the fight against antitrust protectionism worth forcing Ameri-
can business to live with per se domestic rules in export trade? Would
the application of per se rules impede American business' attempt to
enter foreign markets competitively?
This article has offered a two-tiered answer. First, the premise that
horizontal restrictive practices aimed abroad result in injuries which
only fall abroad is faulty. Spillover and entry barrier effects often pre-
vent containment of the injury to foreign markets.
Second, the wisdom of antitrust protectionism has been directly
confronted. The costs of antitrust protectionism on international co-
mity are high. Both in terms of the problem of leaving the United
States open to charges of hypocrisy and double standards in its anti-
trust policy as well as in terms of the real threat of foreign retaliation,
antitrust law should apply with equal force irrespective of the national-
ity of the persons injured so long as subject matter jurisdiction can be
made out. If competition's appellation as the summa bonum of Ameri-
can trade is to be symmetric-applying with equal force both domesti-
cally and internationally-a parochial application of the Sherman Act
to export trade may not be tolerated.
Antitrust protectionism does not make economic sense either. In-
ternational trade theory shows that the products America does well in
exporting cannot be successfully exported by a horizontal combination.
Horizontal combinations are needed neither to reduce trade barriers
nor to reduce the costs of exporting to competitive levels. Finally, in
those few areas where horizontal cooperation truly is needed for suc-
cessful market entry, the combination will be subject to rule of reason
rather than per se standards.
Under our jurisdictional model, only independent foreign distribu-
tion systems buying goods from a company exporting from the United
States will be within the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act. The
article discusses the substantive law on various restrictive distribution
practices: tying, exclusive distributorships, territorial restrictions, and
resale price maintenance. Distribution arrangements in foreign mar-
kets are potentially an area of considerable antitrust activity despite the
small number of decided cases. Yet the available guideposts indicate
that distribution systems which meet most American companies' needs
can be constructed without substantial American, although perhaps
with substantial foreign, antitrust law risk.
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On the basis of the available evidence, the Sherman Act does not
substantially impede American export trade in goods and services. The
theoretical arguments of this article predict that such evidence will not
be found. At the very least, we should not respond to a discredited
shepherd's cry of "wolf' until we are presented with some hard evi-
dence of an adverse impact on American export trade.
